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Libraries: Move to Userland/Libraries/

This commit is contained in:
Andreas Kling 2021-01-12 12:17:30 +01:00
parent dc28c07fa5
commit 13d7c09125
1857 changed files with 266 additions and 274 deletions

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set(SOURCES
ClientHandshake.cpp
Exchange.cpp
Handshake.cpp
Record.cpp
Socket.cpp
TLSv12.cpp
)
serenity_lib(LibTLS tls)
target_link_libraries(LibTLS LibCore LibCrypto)

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, the SerenityOS developers.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#pragma once
#include <AK/ByteBuffer.h>
#include <AK/Forward.h>
#include <AK/Singleton.h>
#include <AK/Types.h>
#include <LibCrypto/BigInt/UnsignedBigInteger.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/RSA.h>
namespace TLS {
enum class CertificateKeyAlgorithm {
Unsupported = 0x00,
RSA_RSA = 0x01,
RSA_MD5 = 0x04,
RSA_SHA1 = 0x05,
RSA_SHA256 = 0x0b,
RSA_SHA512 = 0x0d,
};
struct Certificate {
u16 version;
CertificateKeyAlgorithm algorithm;
CertificateKeyAlgorithm key_algorithm;
CertificateKeyAlgorithm ec_algorithm;
ByteBuffer exponent;
Crypto::PK::RSAPublicKey<Crypto::UnsignedBigInteger> public_key;
Crypto::PK::RSAPrivateKey<Crypto::UnsignedBigInteger> private_key;
String issuer_country;
String issuer_state;
String issuer_location;
String issuer_entity;
String issuer_subject;
String issuer_unit;
String not_before;
String not_after;
String country;
String state;
String location;
String entity;
String subject;
String unit;
Vector<String> SAN;
u8* ocsp;
Crypto::UnsignedBigInteger serial_number;
ByteBuffer sign_key;
ByteBuffer fingerprint;
ByteBuffer der;
ByteBuffer data;
bool is_valid() const;
};
class DefaultRootCACertificates {
public:
DefaultRootCACertificates();
const Vector<Certificate>& certificates() const { return m_ca_certificates; }
static DefaultRootCACertificates& the() { return s_the; }
private:
static AK::Singleton<DefaultRootCACertificates> s_the;
Vector<Certificate> m_ca_certificates;
};
}
using TLS::Certificate;
using TLS::DefaultRootCACertificates;

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <AK/Endian.h>
#include <AK/Random.h>
#include <LibCore/Timer.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
namespace TLS {
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_server_hello_done(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
{
if (buffer.size() < 3)
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
size_t size = buffer[0] * 0x10000 + buffer[1] * 0x100 + buffer[2];
if (buffer.size() - 3 < size)
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
return size + 3;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_hello(ReadonlyBytes buffer, WritePacketStage& write_packets)
{
write_packets = WritePacketStage::Initial;
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Disconnected && m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Renegotiating) {
dbgln("unexpected hello message");
return (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
}
ssize_t res = 0;
size_t min_hello_size = 41;
if (min_hello_size > buffer.size()) {
dbgln("need more data");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
size_t following_bytes = buffer[0] * 0x10000 + buffer[1] * 0x100 + buffer[2];
res += 3;
if (buffer.size() - res < following_bytes) {
dbg() << "not enough data after header: " << buffer.size() - res << " < " << following_bytes;
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
if (buffer.size() - res < 2) {
dbgln("not enough data for version");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
auto version = (Version)AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(res));
res += 2;
if (!supports_version(version))
return (i8)Error::NotSafe;
memcpy(m_context.remote_random, buffer.offset_pointer(res), sizeof(m_context.remote_random));
res += sizeof(m_context.remote_random);
u8 session_length = buffer[res++];
if (buffer.size() - res < session_length) {
dbgln("not enough data for session id");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
if (session_length && session_length <= 32) {
memcpy(m_context.session_id, buffer.offset_pointer(res), session_length);
m_context.session_id_size = session_length;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Remote session ID:");
print_buffer(ReadonlyBytes { m_context.session_id, session_length });
#endif
} else {
m_context.session_id_size = 0;
}
res += session_length;
if (buffer.size() - res < 2) {
dbgln("not enough data for cipher suite listing");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
auto cipher = (CipherSuite)AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(res));
res += 2;
if (!supports_cipher(cipher)) {
m_context.cipher = CipherSuite::Invalid;
dbgln("No supported cipher could be agreed upon");
return (i8)Error::NoCommonCipher;
}
m_context.cipher = cipher;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Cipher: " << (u16)cipher;
#endif
// The handshake hash function is _always_ SHA256
m_context.handshake_hash.initialize(Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA256);
if (buffer.size() - res < 1) {
dbgln("not enough data for compression spec");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
u8 compression = buffer[res++];
if (compression != 0) {
dbgln("Server told us to compress, we will not!");
return (i8)Error::CompressionNotSupported;
}
if (res > 0) {
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Renegotiating)
m_context.connection_status = ConnectionStatus::Negotiating;
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
write_packets = WritePacketStage::ServerHandshake;
}
}
if (res > 2) {
res += 2;
}
while ((ssize_t)buffer.size() - res >= 4) {
auto extension_type = (HandshakeExtension)AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(res));
res += 2;
u16 extension_length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(res));
res += 2;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "extension " << (u16)extension_type << " with length " << extension_length;
#endif
if (extension_length) {
if (buffer.size() - res < extension_length) {
dbgln("not enough data for extension");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
// SNI
if (extension_type == HandshakeExtension::ServerName) {
u16 sni_host_length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(res + 3));
if (buffer.size() - res - 5 < sni_host_length) {
dbg() << "Not enough data for sni " << (buffer.size() - res - 5) << " < " << sni_host_length;
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
if (sni_host_length) {
m_context.SNI = String { (const char*)buffer.offset_pointer(res + 5), sni_host_length };
dbg() << "server name indicator: " << m_context.SNI;
}
} else if (extension_type == HandshakeExtension::ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation && m_context.alpn.size()) {
if (buffer.size() - res > 2) {
auto alpn_length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(res));
if (alpn_length && alpn_length <= extension_length - 2) {
const u8* alpn = buffer.offset_pointer(res + 2);
size_t alpn_position = 0;
while (alpn_position < alpn_length) {
u8 alpn_size = alpn[alpn_position++];
if (alpn_size + alpn_position >= extension_length)
break;
String alpn_str { (const char*)alpn + alpn_position, alpn_length };
if (alpn_size && m_context.alpn.contains_slow(alpn_str)) {
m_context.negotiated_alpn = alpn_str;
dbg() << "negotiated alpn: " << alpn_str;
break;
}
alpn_position += alpn_length;
if (!m_context.is_server) // server hello must contain one ALPN
break;
}
}
}
} else if (extension_type == HandshakeExtension::SignatureAlgorithms) {
dbgln("supported signatures: ");
print_buffer(buffer.slice(res, extension_length));
// FIXME: what are we supposed to do here?
}
res += extension_length;
}
}
return res;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_finished(ReadonlyBytes buffer, WritePacketStage& write_packets)
{
if (m_context.connection_status < ConnectionStatus::KeyExchange || m_context.connection_status == ConnectionStatus::Established) {
dbgln("unexpected finished message");
return (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
}
write_packets = WritePacketStage::Initial;
if (buffer.size() < 3) {
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
size_t index = 3;
u32 size = buffer[0] * 0x10000 + buffer[1] * 0x100 + buffer[2];
if (size < 12) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "finished packet smaller than minimum size: " << size;
#endif
return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
}
if (size < buffer.size() - index) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "not enough data after length: " << size << " > " << buffer.size() - index;
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
// TODO: Compare Hashes
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("FIXME: handle_finished :: Check message validity");
#endif
m_context.connection_status = ConnectionStatus::Established;
if (m_handshake_timeout_timer) {
// Disable the handshake timeout timer as handshake has been established.
m_handshake_timeout_timer->stop();
m_handshake_timeout_timer->remove_from_parent();
m_handshake_timeout_timer = nullptr;
}
if (on_tls_ready_to_write)
on_tls_ready_to_write(*this);
return index + size;
}
void TLSv12::build_random(PacketBuilder& builder)
{
u8 random_bytes[48];
size_t bytes = 48;
AK::fill_with_random(random_bytes, bytes);
// remove zeros from the random bytes
for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes; ++i) {
if (!random_bytes[i])
random_bytes[i--] = AK::get_random<u8>();
}
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("Server mode not supported");
return;
} else {
*(u16*)random_bytes = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)Version::V12);
}
m_context.premaster_key = ByteBuffer::copy(random_bytes, bytes);
const auto& certificate_option = verify_chain_and_get_matching_certificate(m_context.SNI); // if the SNI is empty, we'll make a special case and match *a* leaf certificate.
if (!certificate_option.has_value()) {
dbgln("certificate verification failed :(");
alert(AlertLevel::Critical, AlertDescription::BadCertificate);
return;
}
auto& certificate = m_context.certificates[certificate_option.value()];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("PreMaster secret");
print_buffer(m_context.premaster_key);
#endif
Crypto::PK::RSA_PKCS1_EME rsa(certificate.public_key.modulus(), 0, certificate.public_key.public_exponent());
u8 out[rsa.output_size()];
auto outbuf = Bytes { out, rsa.output_size() };
rsa.encrypt(m_context.premaster_key, outbuf);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Encrypted: ");
print_buffer(outbuf);
#endif
if (!compute_master_secret(bytes)) {
dbgln("oh noes we could not derive a master key :(");
return;
}
builder.append_u24(outbuf.size() + 2);
builder.append((u16)outbuf.size());
builder.append(outbuf);
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_payload(ReadonlyBytes vbuffer)
{
if (m_context.connection_status == ConnectionStatus::Established) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Renegotiation attempt ignored");
#endif
// FIXME: We should properly say "NoRenegotiation", but that causes a handshake failure
// so we just roll with it and pretend that we _did_ renegotiate
// This will cause issues when we decide to have long-lasting connections, but
// we do not have those at the moment :^)
return 1;
}
auto buffer = vbuffer;
auto buffer_length = buffer.size();
auto original_length = buffer_length;
while (buffer_length >= 4 && !m_context.critical_error) {
ssize_t payload_res = 0;
if (buffer_length < 1)
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
auto type = buffer[0];
auto write_packets { WritePacketStage::Initial };
size_t payload_size = buffer[1] * 0x10000 + buffer[2] * 0x100 + buffer[3] + 3;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "payload size: " << payload_size << " buffer length: " << buffer_length;
#endif
if (payload_size + 1 > buffer_length)
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
switch (type) {
case HelloRequest:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[0] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected hello request message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[0];
dbgln("hello request (renegotiation?)");
if (m_context.connection_status == ConnectionStatus::Established) {
// renegotiation
payload_res = (i8)Error::NoRenegotiation;
} else {
// :shrug:
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
}
break;
case ClientHello:
// FIXME: We only support client mode right now
if (m_context.is_server) {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
case ServerHello:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[2] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected server hello message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[2];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("server hello");
#endif
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
payload_res = handle_hello(buffer.slice(1, payload_size), write_packets);
}
break;
case HelloVerifyRequest:
dbgln("unsupported: DTLS");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
case CertificateMessage:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[4] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected certificate message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[4];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("certificate");
#endif
if (m_context.connection_status == ConnectionStatus::Negotiating) {
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
payload_res = handle_certificate(buffer.slice(1, payload_size));
if (m_context.certificates.size()) {
auto it = m_context.certificates.find_if([](const auto& cert) { return cert.is_valid(); });
if (it.is_end()) {
// no valid certificates
dbgln("No valid certificates found");
payload_res = (i8)Error::BadCertificate;
m_context.critical_error = payload_res;
break;
}
// swap the first certificate with the valid one
if (it.index() != 0)
swap(m_context.certificates[0], m_context.certificates[it.index()]);
}
} else {
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
}
break;
case ServerKeyExchange:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[5] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected server key exchange message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[5];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("server key exchange");
#endif
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
payload_res = handle_server_key_exchange(buffer.slice(1, payload_size));
}
break;
case CertificateRequest:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[6] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected certificate request message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[6];
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("invalid request");
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
// we do not support "certificate request"
dbgln("certificate request");
if (on_tls_certificate_request)
on_tls_certificate_request(*this);
m_context.client_verified = VerificationNeeded;
}
break;
case ServerHelloDone:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[7] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected server hello done message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[7];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("server hello done");
#endif
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
payload_res = handle_server_hello_done(buffer.slice(1, payload_size));
if (payload_res > 0)
write_packets = WritePacketStage::ClientHandshake;
}
break;
case CertificateVerify:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[8] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected certificate verify message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[8];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("certificate verify");
#endif
if (m_context.connection_status == ConnectionStatus::KeyExchange) {
payload_res = handle_verify(buffer.slice(1, payload_size));
} else {
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
}
break;
case ClientKeyExchange:
if (m_context.handshake_messages[9] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected client key exchange message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[9];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("client key exchange");
#endif
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("unsupported: server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
}
break;
case Finished:
if (m_context.cached_handshake) {
m_context.cached_handshake.clear();
}
if (m_context.handshake_messages[10] >= 1) {
dbgln("unexpected finished message");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
break;
}
++m_context.handshake_messages[10];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("finished");
#endif
payload_res = handle_finished(buffer.slice(1, payload_size), write_packets);
if (payload_res > 0) {
memset(m_context.handshake_messages, 0, sizeof(m_context.handshake_messages));
}
break;
default:
dbg() << "message type not understood: " << type;
return (i8)Error::NotUnderstood;
}
if (type != HelloRequest) {
update_hash(buffer.slice(0, payload_size + 1));
}
// if something went wrong, send an alert about it
if (payload_res < 0) {
switch ((Error)payload_res) {
case Error::UnexpectedMessage: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::CompressionNotSupported: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecompressionFailure);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::BrokenPacket: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecodeError);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::NotVerified: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::BadCertificate: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadCertificate);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::UnsupportedCertificate: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnsupportedCertificate);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::NoCommonCipher: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::NotUnderstood: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::InternalError);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::NoRenegotiation: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::NoRenegotiation);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::DecryptionFailed: {
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed);
write_packet(packet);
break;
}
case Error::NeedMoreData:
// Ignore this, as it's not an "error"
break;
default:
dbg() << "Unknown TLS::Error with value " << payload_res;
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
break;
}
if (payload_res < 0)
return payload_res;
}
switch (write_packets) {
case WritePacketStage::Initial:
// nothing to write
break;
case WritePacketStage::ClientHandshake:
if (m_context.client_verified == VerificationNeeded) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("> Client Certificate");
#endif
auto packet = build_certificate();
write_packet(packet);
m_context.client_verified = Verified;
}
{
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("> Key exchange");
#endif
auto packet = build_client_key_exchange();
write_packet(packet);
}
{
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("> change cipher spec");
#endif
auto packet = build_change_cipher_spec();
write_packet(packet);
}
m_context.cipher_spec_set = 1;
m_context.local_sequence_number = 0;
{
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("> client finished");
#endif
auto packet = build_finished();
write_packet(packet);
}
m_context.cipher_spec_set = 0;
break;
case WritePacketStage::ServerHandshake:
// server handshake
dbgln("UNSUPPORTED: Server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
break;
case WritePacketStage::Finished:
// finished
{
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("> change cipher spec");
#endif
auto packet = build_change_cipher_spec();
write_packet(packet);
}
{
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("> client finished");
#endif
auto packet = build_finished();
write_packet(packet);
}
m_context.connection_status = ConnectionStatus::Established;
break;
}
payload_size++;
buffer_length -= payload_size;
buffer = buffer.slice(payload_size, buffer_length);
}
return original_length;
}
}

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
namespace TLS {
bool TLSv12::expand_key()
{
u8 key[192]; // soooooooo many constants
auto key_buffer = Bytes { key, sizeof(key) };
auto is_aead = this->is_aead();
if (m_context.master_key.size() == 0) {
dbgln("expand_key() with empty master key");
return false;
}
auto key_size = key_length();
auto mac_size = mac_length();
auto iv_size = iv_length();
pseudorandom_function(
key_buffer,
m_context.master_key,
(const u8*)"key expansion", 13,
ReadonlyBytes { m_context.remote_random, sizeof(m_context.remote_random) },
ReadonlyBytes { m_context.local_random, sizeof(m_context.local_random) });
size_t offset = 0;
if (is_aead) {
iv_size = 4; // Explicit IV size.
} else {
memcpy(m_context.crypto.local_mac, key + offset, mac_size);
offset += mac_size;
memcpy(m_context.crypto.remote_mac, key + offset, mac_size);
offset += mac_size;
}
auto client_key = key + offset;
offset += key_size;
auto server_key = key + offset;
offset += key_size;
auto client_iv = key + offset;
offset += iv_size;
auto server_iv = key + offset;
offset += iv_size;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("client key");
print_buffer(client_key, key_size);
dbgln("server key");
print_buffer(server_key, key_size);
dbgln("client iv");
print_buffer(client_iv, iv_size);
dbgln("server iv");
print_buffer(server_iv, iv_size);
if (!is_aead) {
dbgln("client mac key");
print_buffer(m_context.crypto.local_mac, mac_size);
dbgln("server mac key");
print_buffer(m_context.crypto.remote_mac, mac_size);
}
#endif
if (is_aead) {
memcpy(m_context.crypto.local_aead_iv, client_iv, iv_size);
memcpy(m_context.crypto.remote_aead_iv, server_iv, iv_size);
m_aes_local.gcm = make<Crypto::Cipher::AESCipher::GCMMode>(ReadonlyBytes { client_key, key_size }, key_size * 8, Crypto::Cipher::Intent::Encryption, Crypto::Cipher::PaddingMode::RFC5246);
m_aes_remote.gcm = make<Crypto::Cipher::AESCipher::GCMMode>(ReadonlyBytes { server_key, key_size }, key_size * 8, Crypto::Cipher::Intent::Decryption, Crypto::Cipher::PaddingMode::RFC5246);
} else {
memcpy(m_context.crypto.local_iv, client_iv, iv_size);
memcpy(m_context.crypto.remote_iv, server_iv, iv_size);
m_aes_local.cbc = make<Crypto::Cipher::AESCipher::CBCMode>(ReadonlyBytes { client_key, key_size }, key_size * 8, Crypto::Cipher::Intent::Encryption, Crypto::Cipher::PaddingMode::RFC5246);
m_aes_remote.cbc = make<Crypto::Cipher::AESCipher::CBCMode>(ReadonlyBytes { server_key, key_size }, key_size * 8, Crypto::Cipher::Intent::Decryption, Crypto::Cipher::PaddingMode::RFC5246);
}
m_context.crypto.created = 1;
return true;
}
void TLSv12::pseudorandom_function(Bytes output, ReadonlyBytes secret, const u8* label, size_t label_length, ReadonlyBytes seed, ReadonlyBytes seed_b)
{
if (!secret.size()) {
dbgln("null secret");
return;
}
// RFC 5246: "In this section, we define one PRF, based on HMAC. This PRF with the
// SHA-256 hash function is used for all cipher suites defined in this
// document and in TLS documents published prior to this document when
// TLS 1.2 is negotiated."
// Apparently this PRF _always_ uses SHA256
Crypto::Authentication::HMAC<Crypto::Hash::SHA256> hmac(secret);
auto l_seed_size = label_length + seed.size() + seed_b.size();
u8 l_seed[l_seed_size];
auto label_seed_buffer = Bytes { l_seed, l_seed_size };
label_seed_buffer.overwrite(0, label, label_length);
label_seed_buffer.overwrite(label_length, seed.data(), seed.size());
label_seed_buffer.overwrite(label_length + seed.size(), seed_b.data(), seed_b.size());
auto digest_size = hmac.digest_size();
u8 digest[digest_size];
auto digest_0 = Bytes { digest, digest_size };
digest_0.overwrite(0, hmac.process(label_seed_buffer).immutable_data(), digest_size);
size_t index = 0;
while (index < output.size()) {
hmac.update(digest_0);
hmac.update(label_seed_buffer);
auto digest_1 = hmac.digest();
auto copy_size = min(digest_size, output.size() - index);
output.overwrite(index, digest_1.immutable_data(), copy_size);
index += copy_size;
digest_0.overwrite(0, hmac.process(digest_0).immutable_data(), digest_size);
}
}
bool TLSv12::compute_master_secret(size_t length)
{
if (m_context.premaster_key.size() == 0 || length < 48) {
dbgln("there's no way I can make a master secret like this");
dbg() << "I'd like to talk to your manager about this length of " << length;
return false;
}
m_context.master_key.clear();
m_context.master_key.grow(length);
pseudorandom_function(
m_context.master_key,
m_context.premaster_key,
(const u8*)"master secret", 13,
ReadonlyBytes { m_context.local_random, sizeof(m_context.local_random) },
ReadonlyBytes { m_context.remote_random, sizeof(m_context.remote_random) });
m_context.premaster_key.clear();
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("master key:");
print_buffer(m_context.master_key);
#endif
expand_key();
return true;
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_certificate()
{
PacketBuilder builder { MessageType::Handshake, m_context.version };
Vector<const Certificate*> certificates;
Vector<Certificate>* local_certificates = nullptr;
if (m_context.is_server) {
dbgln("Unsupported: Server mode");
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
local_certificates = &m_context.client_certificates;
}
constexpr size_t der_length_delta = 3;
constexpr size_t certificate_vector_header_size = 3;
size_t total_certificate_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < local_certificates->size(); ++i) {
auto& certificate = local_certificates->at(i);
if (!certificate.der.is_empty()) {
total_certificate_size += certificate.der.size() + der_length_delta;
// FIXME: Check for and respond with only the requested certificate types.
if (true) {
certificates.append(&certificate);
}
}
}
builder.append((u8)HandshakeType::CertificateMessage);
if (!total_certificate_size) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("No certificates, sending empty certificate message");
#endif
builder.append_u24(certificate_vector_header_size);
builder.append_u24(total_certificate_size);
} else {
builder.append_u24(total_certificate_size + certificate_vector_header_size); // 3 bytes for header
builder.append_u24(total_certificate_size);
for (auto& certificate : certificates) {
if (!certificate->der.is_empty()) {
builder.append_u24(certificate->der.size());
builder.append(certificate->der.bytes());
}
}
}
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
return packet;
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_change_cipher_spec()
{
PacketBuilder builder { MessageType::ChangeCipher, m_context.version, 64 };
builder.append((u8)1);
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
m_context.local_sequence_number = 0;
return packet;
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_server_key_exchange()
{
dbgln("FIXME: build_server_key_exchange");
return {};
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_client_key_exchange()
{
PacketBuilder builder { MessageType::Handshake, m_context.version };
builder.append((u8)HandshakeType::ClientKeyExchange);
build_random(builder);
m_context.connection_status = ConnectionStatus::KeyExchange;
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
return packet;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_server_key_exchange(ReadonlyBytes)
{
dbgln("FIXME: parse_server_key_exchange");
return 0;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_verify(ReadonlyBytes)
{
dbgln("FIXME: parse_verify");
return 0;
}
}

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <AK/Random.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
namespace TLS {
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_hello()
{
AK::fill_with_random(&m_context.local_random, 32);
auto packet_version = (u16)m_context.version;
auto version = (u16)m_context.version;
PacketBuilder builder { MessageType::Handshake, packet_version };
builder.append((u8)ClientHello);
// hello length (for later)
u8 dummy[3] = {};
builder.append(dummy, 3);
auto start_length = builder.length();
builder.append(version);
builder.append(m_context.local_random, sizeof(m_context.local_random));
builder.append(m_context.session_id_size);
if (m_context.session_id_size)
builder.append(m_context.session_id, m_context.session_id_size);
size_t extension_length = 0;
size_t alpn_length = 0;
size_t alpn_negotiated_length = 0;
// ALPN
if (!m_context.negotiated_alpn.is_null()) {
alpn_negotiated_length = m_context.negotiated_alpn.length();
alpn_length = alpn_negotiated_length + 1;
extension_length += alpn_length + 6;
} else if (m_context.alpn.size()) {
for (auto& alpn : m_context.alpn) {
size_t length = alpn.length();
alpn_length += length + 1;
}
if (alpn_length)
extension_length += alpn_length + 6;
}
// Ciphers
builder.append((u16)(5 * sizeof(u16)));
builder.append((u16)CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256);
builder.append((u16)CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256);
builder.append((u16)CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA);
builder.append((u16)CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA);
builder.append((u16)CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256);
// we don't like compression
builder.append((u8)1);
builder.append((u8)0);
// set SNI if we have one
auto sni_length = 0;
if (!m_context.SNI.is_null())
sni_length = m_context.SNI.length();
if (sni_length)
extension_length += sni_length + 9;
builder.append((u16)extension_length);
if (sni_length) {
// SNI extension
builder.append((u16)HandshakeExtension::ServerName);
// extension length
builder.append((u16)(sni_length + 5));
// SNI length
builder.append((u16)(sni_length + 3));
// SNI type
builder.append((u8)0);
// SNI host length + value
builder.append((u16)sni_length);
builder.append((const u8*)m_context.SNI.characters(), sni_length);
}
if (alpn_length) {
// TODO
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
// set the "length" field of the packet
size_t remaining = builder.length() - start_length;
size_t payload_position = 6;
builder.set(payload_position, remaining / 0x10000);
remaining %= 0x10000;
builder.set(payload_position + 1, remaining / 0x100);
remaining %= 0x100;
builder.set(payload_position + 2, remaining);
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
return packet;
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_alert(bool critical, u8 code)
{
PacketBuilder builder(MessageType::Alert, (u16)m_context.version);
builder.append((u8)(critical ? AlertLevel::Critical : AlertLevel::Warning));
builder.append(code);
if (critical)
m_context.critical_error = code;
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
return packet;
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::build_finished()
{
PacketBuilder builder { MessageType::Handshake, m_context.version, 12 + 64 };
builder.append((u8)HandshakeType::Finished);
u32 out_size = 12;
builder.append_u24(out_size);
u8 out[out_size];
auto outbuffer = Bytes { out, out_size };
auto dummy = ByteBuffer::create_zeroed(0);
auto digest = m_context.handshake_hash.digest();
auto hashbuf = ReadonlyBytes { digest.immutable_data(), m_context.handshake_hash.digest_size() };
pseudorandom_function(outbuffer, m_context.master_key, (const u8*)"client finished", 15, hashbuf, dummy);
builder.append(outbuffer);
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
return packet;
}
void TLSv12::alert(AlertLevel level, AlertDescription code)
{
auto the_alert = build_alert(level == AlertLevel::Critical, (u8)code);
write_packet(the_alert);
flush();
}
}

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <AK/Endian.h>
#include <AK/MemoryStream.h>
#include <LibCore/Timer.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
namespace TLS {
void TLSv12::write_packet(ByteBuffer& packet)
{
m_context.tls_buffer.append(packet.data(), packet.size());
if (m_context.connection_status > ConnectionStatus::Disconnected) {
if (!m_has_scheduled_write_flush) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Scheduling write of " << m_context.tls_buffer.size();
#endif
deferred_invoke([this](auto&) { write_into_socket(); });
m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
} else {
// multiple packet are available, let's flush some out
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Flushing scheduled write of " << m_context.tls_buffer.size();
#endif
write_into_socket();
// the deferred invoke is still in place
m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
}
}
}
void TLSv12::update_packet(ByteBuffer& packet)
{
u32 header_size = 5;
*(u16*)packet.offset_pointer(3) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)(packet.size() - header_size));
if (packet[0] != (u8)MessageType::ChangeCipher) {
if (packet[0] == (u8)MessageType::Handshake && packet.size() > header_size) {
u8 handshake_type = packet[header_size];
if (handshake_type != HandshakeType::HelloRequest && handshake_type != HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest) {
update_hash(packet.bytes().slice(header_size, packet.size() - header_size));
}
}
if (m_context.cipher_spec_set && m_context.crypto.created) {
size_t length = packet.size() - header_size;
size_t block_size, padding, mac_size;
if (!is_aead()) {
block_size = m_aes_local.cbc->cipher().block_size();
// If the length is already a multiple a block_size,
// an entire block of padding is added.
// In short, we _never_ have no padding.
mac_size = mac_length();
length += mac_size;
padding = block_size - length % block_size;
length += padding;
} else {
block_size = m_aes_local.gcm->cipher().block_size();
padding = 0;
mac_size = 0; // AEAD provides its own authentication scheme.
}
if (m_context.crypto.created == 1) {
// `buffer' will continue to be encrypted
auto buffer = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length);
size_t buffer_position = 0;
auto iv_size = iv_length();
// copy the packet, sans the header
buffer.overwrite(buffer_position, packet.offset_pointer(header_size), packet.size() - header_size);
buffer_position += packet.size() - header_size;
ByteBuffer ct;
if (is_aead()) {
// We need enough space for a header, the data, a tag, and the IV
ct = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length + header_size + iv_size + 16);
// copy the header over
ct.overwrite(0, packet.data(), header_size - 2);
// AEAD AAD (13)
// Seq. no (8)
// content type (1)
// version (2)
// length (2)
u8 aad[13];
Bytes aad_bytes { aad, 13 };
OutputMemoryStream aad_stream { aad_bytes };
u64 seq_no = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(m_context.local_sequence_number);
u16 len = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)(packet.size() - header_size));
aad_stream.write({ &seq_no, sizeof(seq_no) });
aad_stream.write(packet.bytes().slice(0, 3)); // content-type + version
aad_stream.write({ &len, sizeof(len) }); // length
ASSERT(aad_stream.is_end());
// AEAD IV (12)
// IV (4)
// (Nonce) (8)
// -- Our GCM impl takes 16 bytes
// zero (4)
u8 iv[16];
Bytes iv_bytes { iv, 16 };
Bytes { m_context.crypto.local_aead_iv, 4 }.copy_to(iv_bytes);
AK::fill_with_random(iv_bytes.offset(4), 8);
memset(iv_bytes.offset(12), 0, 4);
// write the random part of the iv out
iv_bytes.slice(4, 8).copy_to(ct.bytes().slice(header_size));
// Write the encrypted data and the tag
m_aes_local.gcm->encrypt(
packet.bytes().slice(header_size, length),
ct.bytes().slice(header_size + 8, length),
iv_bytes,
aad_bytes,
ct.bytes().slice(header_size + 8 + length, 16));
ASSERT(header_size + 8 + length + 16 == ct.size());
} else {
// We need enough space for a header, iv_length bytes of IV and whatever the packet contains
ct = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length + header_size + iv_size);
// copy the header over
ct.overwrite(0, packet.data(), header_size - 2);
// get the appropricate HMAC value for the entire packet
auto mac = hmac_message(packet, {}, mac_size, true);
// write the MAC
buffer.overwrite(buffer_position, mac.data(), mac.size());
buffer_position += mac.size();
// Apply the padding (a packet MUST always be padded)
memset(buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position), padding - 1, padding);
buffer_position += padding;
ASSERT(buffer_position == buffer.size());
auto iv = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(iv_size);
AK::fill_with_random(iv.data(), iv.size());
// write it into the ciphertext portion of the message
ct.overwrite(header_size, iv.data(), iv.size());
ASSERT(header_size + iv_size + length == ct.size());
ASSERT(length % block_size == 0);
// get a block to encrypt into
auto view = ct.bytes().slice(header_size + iv_size, length);
m_aes_local.cbc->encrypt(buffer, view, iv);
}
// store the correct ciphertext length into the packet
u16 ct_length = (u16)ct.size() - header_size;
*(u16*)ct.offset_pointer(header_size - 2) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(ct_length);
// replace the packet with the ciphertext
packet = ct;
}
}
}
++m_context.local_sequence_number;
}
void TLSv12::update_hash(ReadonlyBytes message)
{
m_context.handshake_hash.update(message);
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::hmac_message(const ReadonlyBytes& buf, const Optional<ReadonlyBytes> buf2, size_t mac_length, bool local)
{
u64 sequence_number = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(local ? m_context.local_sequence_number : m_context.remote_sequence_number);
ensure_hmac(mac_length, local);
auto& hmac = local ? *m_hmac_local : *m_hmac_remote;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("========================= PACKET DATA ==========================");
print_buffer((const u8*)&sequence_number, sizeof(u64));
print_buffer(buf.data(), buf.size());
if (buf2.has_value())
print_buffer(buf2.value().data(), buf2.value().size());
dbgln("========================= PACKET DATA ==========================");
#endif
hmac.update((const u8*)&sequence_number, sizeof(u64));
hmac.update(buf);
if (buf2.has_value() && buf2.value().size()) {
hmac.update(buf2.value());
}
auto digest = hmac.digest();
auto mac = ByteBuffer::copy(digest.immutable_data(), digest.data_length());
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "HMAC of the block for sequence number " << sequence_number;
print_buffer(mac);
#endif
return mac;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_message(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
{
auto res { 5ll };
size_t header_size = res;
ssize_t payload_res = 0;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "buffer size: " << buffer.size();
#endif
if (buffer.size() < 5) {
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
auto type = (MessageType)buffer[0];
size_t buffer_position { 1 };
// FIXME: Read the version and verify it
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
auto version = (Version) * (const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position);
dbg() << "type: " << (u8)type << " version: " << (u16)version;
#endif
buffer_position += 2;
auto length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position));
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "record length: " << length << " at offset: " << buffer_position;
#endif
buffer_position += 2;
if (buffer_position + length > buffer.size()) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "record length more than what we have: " << buffer.size();
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "message type: " << (u8)type << ", length: " << length;
#endif
auto plain = buffer.slice(buffer_position, buffer.size() - buffer_position);
ByteBuffer decrypted;
if (m_context.cipher_spec_set && type != MessageType::ChangeCipher) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Encrypted: ");
print_buffer(buffer.slice(header_size, length));
#endif
if (is_aead()) {
ASSERT(m_aes_remote.gcm);
if (length < 24) {
dbgln("Invalid packet length");
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptError);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
}
auto packet_length = length - iv_length() - 16;
auto payload = plain;
decrypted = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(packet_length);
// AEAD AAD (13)
// Seq. no (8)
// content type (1)
// version (2)
// length (2)
u8 aad[13];
Bytes aad_bytes { aad, 13 };
OutputMemoryStream aad_stream { aad_bytes };
u64 seq_no = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(m_context.remote_sequence_number);
u16 len = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)packet_length);
aad_stream.write({ &seq_no, sizeof(seq_no) }); // Sequence number
aad_stream.write(buffer.slice(0, header_size - 2)); // content-type + version
aad_stream.write({ &len, sizeof(u16) });
ASSERT(aad_stream.is_end());
auto nonce = payload.slice(0, iv_length());
payload = payload.slice(iv_length());
// AEAD IV (12)
// IV (4)
// (Nonce) (8)
// -- Our GCM impl takes 16 bytes
// zero (4)
u8 iv[16];
Bytes iv_bytes { iv, 16 };
Bytes { m_context.crypto.remote_aead_iv, 4 }.copy_to(iv_bytes);
nonce.copy_to(iv_bytes.slice(4));
memset(iv_bytes.offset(12), 0, 4);
auto ciphertext = payload.slice(0, payload.size() - 16);
auto tag = payload.slice(ciphertext.size());
auto consistency = m_aes_remote.gcm->decrypt(
ciphertext,
decrypted,
iv_bytes,
aad_bytes,
tag);
if (consistency != Crypto::VerificationConsistency::Consistent) {
dbg() << "integrity check failed (tag length " << tag.size() << ")";
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::IntegrityCheckFailed;
}
plain = decrypted;
} else {
ASSERT(m_aes_remote.cbc);
auto iv_size = iv_length();
decrypted = m_aes_remote.cbc->create_aligned_buffer(length - iv_size);
auto iv = buffer.slice(header_size, iv_size);
Bytes decrypted_span = decrypted;
m_aes_remote.cbc->decrypt(buffer.slice(header_size + iv_size, length - iv_size), decrypted_span, iv);
length = decrypted_span.size();
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Decrypted: ");
print_buffer(decrypted);
#endif
auto mac_size = mac_length();
if (length < mac_size) {
dbgln("broken packet");
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptError);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
}
length -= mac_size;
const u8* message_hmac = decrypted_span.offset(length);
u8 temp_buf[5];
memcpy(temp_buf, buffer.offset_pointer(0), 3);
*(u16*)(temp_buf + 3) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(length);
auto hmac = hmac_message({ temp_buf, 5 }, decrypted_span.slice(0, length), mac_size);
auto message_mac = ReadonlyBytes { message_hmac, mac_size };
if (hmac != message_mac) {
dbg() << "integrity check failed (mac length " << mac_size << ")";
dbgln("mac received:");
print_buffer(message_mac);
dbgln("mac computed:");
print_buffer(hmac);
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
write_packet(packet);
return (i8)Error::IntegrityCheckFailed;
}
plain = decrypted.bytes().slice(0, length);
}
}
m_context.remote_sequence_number++;
switch (type) {
case MessageType::ApplicationData:
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Established) {
dbgln("unexpected application data");
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
write_packet(packet);
} else {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "application data message of size " << plain.size();
#endif
m_context.application_buffer.append(plain.data(), plain.size());
}
break;
case MessageType::Handshake:
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("tls handshake message");
#endif
payload_res = handle_payload(plain);
break;
case MessageType::ChangeCipher:
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::KeyExchange) {
dbgln("unexpected change cipher message");
auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
} else {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("change cipher spec message");
#endif
m_context.cipher_spec_set = true;
m_context.remote_sequence_number = 0;
}
break;
case MessageType::Alert:
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "alert message of length " << length;
#endif
if (length >= 2) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
print_buffer(plain);
#endif
auto level = plain[0];
auto code = plain[1];
if (level == (u8)AlertLevel::Critical) {
dbg() << "We were alerted of a critical error: " << code << " (" << alert_name((AlertDescription)code) << ")";
m_context.critical_error = code;
try_disambiguate_error();
res = (i8)Error::UnknownError;
} else {
dbg() << "Alert: " << code;
}
if (code == 0) {
// close notify
res += 2;
alert(AlertLevel::Critical, AlertDescription::CloseNotify);
m_context.connection_finished = true;
if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) {
// AWS CloudFront hits this.
dbgln("Server sent a close notify and we haven't agreed on a cipher suite. Treating it as a handshake failure.");
m_context.critical_error = (u8)AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure;
try_disambiguate_error();
}
}
m_context.error_code = (Error)code;
}
break;
default:
dbgln("message not understood");
return (i8)Error::NotUnderstood;
}
if (payload_res < 0)
return payload_res;
if (res > 0)
return header_size + length;
return res;
}
}

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <LibCore/DateTime.h>
#include <LibCore/Timer.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
namespace TLS {
Optional<ByteBuffer> TLSv12::read()
{
if (m_context.application_buffer.size()) {
auto buf = m_context.application_buffer.slice(0, m_context.application_buffer.size());
m_context.application_buffer.clear();
return buf;
}
return {};
}
ByteBuffer TLSv12::read(size_t max_size)
{
if (m_context.application_buffer.size()) {
auto length = min(m_context.application_buffer.size(), max_size);
auto buf = m_context.application_buffer.slice(0, length);
m_context.application_buffer = m_context.application_buffer.slice(length, m_context.application_buffer.size() - length);
return buf;
}
return {};
}
String TLSv12::read_line(size_t max_size)
{
if (!can_read_line())
return {};
auto* start = m_context.application_buffer.data();
auto* newline = (u8*)memchr(m_context.application_buffer.data(), '\n', m_context.application_buffer.size());
ASSERT(newline);
size_t offset = newline - start;
if (offset > max_size)
return {};
auto buffer = ByteBuffer::copy(start, offset);
m_context.application_buffer = m_context.application_buffer.slice(offset + 1, m_context.application_buffer.size() - offset - 1);
return String::copy(buffer, Chomp);
}
bool TLSv12::write(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
{
if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Established) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("write request while not connected");
#endif
return false;
}
PacketBuilder builder { MessageType::ApplicationData, m_context.version, buffer.size() };
builder.append(buffer);
auto packet = builder.build();
update_packet(packet);
write_packet(packet);
return true;
}
bool TLSv12::connect(const String& hostname, int port)
{
set_sni(hostname);
return Core::Socket::connect(hostname, port);
}
bool TLSv12::common_connect(const struct sockaddr* saddr, socklen_t length)
{
if (m_context.critical_error)
return false;
if (Core::Socket::is_connected()) {
if (is_established()) {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
} else {
Core::Socket::close(); // reuse?
}
}
Core::Socket::on_connected = [this] {
Core::Socket::on_ready_to_read = [this] {
read_from_socket();
};
auto packet = build_hello();
write_packet(packet);
deferred_invoke([&](auto&) {
m_handshake_timeout_timer = Core::Timer::create_single_shot(
m_max_wait_time_for_handshake_in_seconds * 1000, [&] {
auto timeout_diff = Core::DateTime::now().timestamp() - m_context.handshake_initiation_timestamp;
// If the timeout duration was actually within the max wait time (with a margin of error),
// we're not operating slow, so the server timed out.
// otherwise, it's our fault that the negotiation is taking too long, so extend the timer :P
if (timeout_diff < m_max_wait_time_for_handshake_in_seconds + 1) {
// The server did not respond fast enough,
// time the connection out.
alert(AlertLevel::Critical, AlertDescription::UserCanceled);
m_context.connection_finished = true;
m_context.tls_buffer.clear();
m_context.error_code = Error::TimedOut;
m_context.critical_error = (u8)Error::TimedOut;
check_connection_state(false); // Notify the client.
} else {
// Extend the timer, we are too slow.
m_handshake_timeout_timer->restart(m_max_wait_time_for_handshake_in_seconds * 1000);
}
},
this);
write_into_socket();
m_handshake_timeout_timer->start();
m_context.handshake_initiation_timestamp = Core::DateTime::now().timestamp();
});
m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
if (on_tls_connected)
on_tls_connected();
};
bool success = Core::Socket::common_connect(saddr, length);
if (!success)
return false;
return true;
}
void TLSv12::read_from_socket()
{
if (m_context.application_buffer.size() > 0) {
deferred_invoke([&](auto&) { read_from_socket(); });
if (on_tls_ready_to_read)
on_tls_ready_to_read(*this);
}
if (!check_connection_state(true))
return;
consume(Core::Socket::read(4096));
}
void TLSv12::write_into_socket()
{
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Flushing cached records: " << m_context.tls_buffer.size() << " established? " << is_established();
#endif
m_has_scheduled_write_flush = false;
if (!check_connection_state(false))
return;
flush();
if (!is_established())
return;
if (!m_context.application_buffer.size()) // hey client, you still have stuff to read...
if (on_tls_ready_to_write)
on_tls_ready_to_write(*this);
}
bool TLSv12::check_connection_state(bool read)
{
if (!Core::Socket::is_open() || !Core::Socket::is_connected() || Core::Socket::eof()) {
// an abrupt closure (the server is a jerk)
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Socket not open, assuming abrupt closure");
#endif
m_context.connection_finished = true;
}
if (m_context.critical_error) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "CRITICAL ERROR " << m_context.critical_error << " :(";
#endif
if (on_tls_error)
on_tls_error((AlertDescription)m_context.critical_error);
return false;
}
if (((read && m_context.application_buffer.size() == 0) || !read) && m_context.connection_finished) {
if (m_context.application_buffer.size() == 0) {
if (on_tls_finished)
on_tls_finished();
}
if (m_context.tls_buffer.size()) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "connection closed without finishing data transfer, " << m_context.tls_buffer.size() << " bytes still in buffer & " << m_context.application_buffer.size() << " bytes in application buffer";
#endif
} else {
m_context.connection_finished = false;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("FINISHED");
#endif
}
if (!m_context.application_buffer.size()) {
m_context.connection_status = ConnectionStatus::Disconnected;
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
bool TLSv12::flush()
{
auto out_buffer = write_buffer().data();
size_t out_buffer_index { 0 };
size_t out_buffer_length = write_buffer().size();
if (out_buffer_length == 0)
return true;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("SENDING...");
print_buffer(out_buffer, out_buffer_length);
#endif
if (Core::Socket::write(&out_buffer[out_buffer_index], out_buffer_length)) {
write_buffer().clear();
return true;
}
if (m_context.send_retries++ == 10) {
// drop the records, we can't send
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Dropping " << write_buffer().size() << " bytes worth of TLS records as max retries has been reached";
#endif
write_buffer().clear();
m_context.send_retries = 0;
}
return false;
}
}

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#pragma once
#include <AK/ByteBuffer.h>
#include <AK/Endian.h>
#include <AK/Types.h>
namespace TLS {
enum class MessageType : u8 {
ChangeCipher = 0x14,
Alert = 0x15,
Handshake = 0x16,
ApplicationData = 0x17,
};
enum class Version : u16 {
V10 = 0x0301,
V11 = 0x0302,
V12 = 0x0303,
V13 = 0x0304
};
class PacketBuilder {
public:
PacketBuilder(MessageType type, u16 version, size_t size_hint = 0xfdf)
: PacketBuilder(type, (Version)version, size_hint)
{
}
PacketBuilder(MessageType type, Version version, size_t size_hint = 0xfdf)
{
m_packet_data = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(size_hint + 16);
m_current_length = 5;
m_packet_data[0] = (u8)type;
*(u16*)m_packet_data.offset_pointer(1) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)version);
}
inline void append(u16 value)
{
value = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(value);
append((const u8*)&value, sizeof(value));
}
inline void append(u8 value)
{
append((const u8*)&value, sizeof(value));
}
inline void append(ReadonlyBytes data)
{
append(data.data(), data.size());
}
inline void append_u24(u32 value)
{
u8 buf[3];
buf[0] = value / 0x10000;
value %= 0x10000;
buf[1] = value / 0x100;
value %= 0x100;
buf[2] = value;
append(buf, 3);
}
inline void append(const u8* data, size_t bytes)
{
if (bytes == 0)
return;
auto old_length = m_current_length;
m_current_length += bytes;
if (m_packet_data.size() < m_current_length) {
m_packet_data.grow(m_current_length);
}
m_packet_data.overwrite(old_length, data, bytes);
}
inline ByteBuffer build()
{
auto length = m_current_length;
m_current_length = 0;
return m_packet_data.slice(0, length);
}
inline void set(size_t offset, u8 value)
{
ASSERT(offset < m_current_length);
m_packet_data[offset] = value;
}
size_t length() const { return m_current_length; }
private:
ByteBuffer m_packet_data;
size_t m_current_length;
};
}

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <AK/Endian.h>
#include <LibCore/ConfigFile.h>
#include <LibCore/DateTime.h>
#include <LibCore/Timer.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
#include <LibCrypto/ASN1/PEM.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
#ifndef SOCK_NONBLOCK
# include <sys/ioctl.h>
#endif
//#define TLS_DEBUG
namespace {
struct OIDChain {
OIDChain* root { nullptr };
u8* oid { nullptr };
};
}
namespace TLS {
// "for now" q&d implementation of ASN1
namespace {
static bool _asn1_is_field_present(const u32* fields, const u32* prefix)
{
size_t i = 0;
while (prefix[i]) {
if (fields[i] != prefix[i])
return false;
++i;
}
return true;
}
static bool _asn1_is_oid(const u8* oid, const u8* compare, size_t length = 3)
{
size_t i = 0;
while (oid[i] && i < length) {
if (oid[i] != compare[i])
return false;
++i;
}
return true;
}
static bool _asn1_is_oid_in_chain(OIDChain* reference_chain, const u8* lookup, size_t lookup_length = 3)
{
auto is_oid = [](const u8* oid, size_t oid_length, const u8* compare, size_t compare_length) {
if (oid_length < compare_length)
compare_length = oid_length;
for (size_t i = 0; i < compare_length; i++) {
if (oid[i] != compare[i])
return false;
}
return true;
};
for (; reference_chain; reference_chain = reference_chain->root) {
if (reference_chain->oid)
if (is_oid(reference_chain->oid, 16, lookup, lookup_length))
return true;
}
return false;
}
static bool _set_algorithm(CertificateKeyAlgorithm& algorithm, const u8* value, size_t length)
{
if (length == 7) {
// Elliptic Curve pubkey
dbgln("Cert.algorithm: EC, unsupported");
return false;
}
if (length == 8) {
// named EC key
dbg() << "Cert.algorithm: Named EC (" << *value << "), unsupported";
return false;
}
if (length == 5) {
// named EC SECP key
dbg() << "Cert.algorithm: Named EC secp (" << *value << "), unsupported";
return false;
}
if (length != 9) {
dbgln("Invalid certificate algorithm");
return false;
}
if (_asn1_is_oid(value, Constants::RSA_SIGN_RSA_OID, 9)) {
algorithm = CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_RSA;
return true;
}
if (_asn1_is_oid(value, Constants::RSA_SIGN_SHA256_OID, 9)) {
algorithm = CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_SHA256;
return true;
}
if (_asn1_is_oid(value, Constants::RSA_SIGN_SHA512_OID, 9)) {
algorithm = CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_SHA512;
return true;
}
if (_asn1_is_oid(value, Constants::RSA_SIGN_SHA1_OID, 9)) {
algorithm = CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_SHA1;
return true;
}
if (_asn1_is_oid(value, Constants::RSA_SIGN_MD5_OID, 9)) {
algorithm = CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_MD5;
return true;
}
dbg() << "Unsupported RSA Signature mode " << value[8];
return false;
}
static size_t _get_asn1_length(const u8* buffer, size_t length, size_t& octets)
{
octets = 0;
if (length < 1)
return 0;
u8 size = buffer[0];
if (size & 0x80) {
octets = size & 0x7f;
if (octets > length - 1) {
return 0;
}
auto reference_octets = octets;
if (octets > 4)
reference_octets = 4;
size_t long_size = 0, coeff = 1;
for (auto i = reference_octets; i > 0; --i) {
long_size += buffer[i] * coeff;
coeff *= 0x100;
}
++octets;
return long_size;
}
++octets;
return size;
}
static ssize_t _parse_asn1(const Context& context, Certificate& cert, const u8* buffer, size_t size, int level, u32* fields, u8* has_key, int client_cert, u8* root_oid, OIDChain* chain)
{
OIDChain local_chain;
local_chain.root = chain;
size_t position = 0;
// parse DER...again
size_t index = 0;
u8 oid[16] { 0 };
local_chain.oid = oid;
if (has_key)
*has_key = 0;
u8 local_has_key = 0;
const u8* cert_data = nullptr;
size_t cert_length = 0;
while (position < size) {
size_t start_position = position;
if (size - position < 2) {
dbgln("not enough data for certificate size");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
u8 first = buffer[position++];
u8 type = first & 0x1f;
u8 constructed = first & 0x20;
size_t octets = 0;
u32 temp;
index++;
if (level <= 0xff)
fields[level - 1] = index;
size_t length = _get_asn1_length((const u8*)&buffer[position], size - position, octets);
if (octets > 4 || octets > size - position) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("could not read the certificate");
#endif
return position;
}
position += octets;
if (size - position < length) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("not enough data for sequence");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
if (length && constructed) {
switch (type) {
case 0x03:
break;
case 0x10:
if (level == 2 && index == 1) {
cert_length = length + position - start_position;
cert_data = buffer + start_position;
}
// public key data
if (!cert.version && _asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::priv_der_id)) {
temp = length + position - start_position;
if (cert.der.size() < temp) {
cert.der.grow(temp);
} else {
cert.der.trim(temp);
}
cert.der.overwrite(0, buffer + start_position, temp);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
local_has_key = false;
_parse_asn1(context, cert, buffer + position, length, level + 1, fields, &local_has_key, client_cert, root_oid, &local_chain);
if ((local_has_key && (!context.is_server || client_cert)) || (client_cert || _asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::pk_id))) {
temp = length + position - start_position;
if (cert.der.size() < temp) {
cert.der.grow(temp);
} else {
cert.der.trim(temp);
}
cert.der.overwrite(0, buffer + start_position, temp);
}
} else {
switch (type) {
case 0x00:
return position;
break;
case 0x01:
temp = buffer[position];
break;
case 0x02:
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::pk_id)) {
if (has_key)
*has_key = true;
if (index == 1)
cert.public_key.set(
Crypto::UnsignedBigInteger::import_data(buffer + position, length),
cert.public_key.public_exponent());
else if (index == 2)
cert.public_key.set(
cert.public_key.modulus(),
Crypto::UnsignedBigInteger::import_data(buffer + position, length));
} else if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::serial_id)) {
cert.serial_number = Crypto::UnsignedBigInteger::import_data(buffer + position, length);
}
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::version_id)) {
if (length == 1)
cert.version = buffer[position];
}
if (chain && length > 2) {
if (_asn1_is_oid_in_chain(chain, Constants::san_oid)) {
StringView alt_name { &buffer[position], length };
cert.SAN.append(alt_name);
}
}
// print_buffer(ReadonlyBytes { buffer + position, length });
break;
case 0x03:
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::pk_id)) {
if (has_key)
*has_key = true;
}
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::sign_id)) {
auto* value = buffer + position;
auto len = length;
if (!value[0] && len % 2) {
++value;
--len;
}
cert.sign_key = ByteBuffer::copy(value, len);
} else {
if (buffer[position] == 0 && length > 256) {
_parse_asn1(context, cert, buffer + position + 1, length - 1, level + 1, fields, &local_has_key, client_cert, root_oid, &local_chain);
} else {
_parse_asn1(context, cert, buffer + position, length, level + 1, fields, &local_has_key, client_cert, root_oid, &local_chain);
}
}
break;
case 0x04:
_parse_asn1(context, cert, buffer + position, length, level + 1, fields, &local_has_key, client_cert, root_oid, &local_chain);
break;
case 0x05:
break;
case 0x06:
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::pk_id)) {
_set_algorithm(cert.key_algorithm, buffer + position, length);
}
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::algorithm_id)) {
_set_algorithm(cert.algorithm, buffer + position, length);
}
if (length < 16)
memcpy(oid, buffer + position, length);
else
memcpy(oid, buffer + position, 16);
if (root_oid)
memcpy(root_oid, oid, 16);
break;
case 0x09:
break;
case 0x17:
case 0x018:
// time
// ignore
break;
case 0x013:
case 0x0c:
case 0x14:
case 0x15:
case 0x16:
case 0x19:
case 0x1a:
case 0x1b:
case 0x1c:
case 0x1d:
case 0x1e:
// printable string and such
if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::issurer_id)) {
if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::country_oid)) {
cert.issuer_country = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::state_oid)) {
cert.issuer_state = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::location_oid)) {
cert.issuer_location = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::entity_oid)) {
cert.issuer_entity = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::subject_oid)) {
cert.issuer_subject = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::unit_oid)) {
cert.issuer_unit = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
}
} else if (_asn1_is_field_present(fields, Constants::owner_id)) {
if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::country_oid)) {
cert.country = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::state_oid)) {
cert.state = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::location_oid)) {
cert.location = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::entity_oid)) {
cert.entity = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::subject_oid)) {
cert.subject = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
} else if (_asn1_is_oid(oid, Constants::unit_oid)) {
cert.unit = String { (const char*)buffer + position, length };
}
}
break;
default:
// dbg() << "unused field " << type;
break;
}
}
position += length;
}
if (level == 2 && cert.sign_key.size() && cert_length && cert_data) {
cert.fingerprint.clear();
Crypto::Hash::Manager hash;
switch (cert.key_algorithm) {
case CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_MD5:
hash.initialize(Crypto::Hash::HashKind::MD5);
break;
case CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_SHA1:
hash.initialize(Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA1);
break;
case CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_SHA256:
hash.initialize(Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA256);
break;
case CertificateKeyAlgorithm::RSA_SHA512:
hash.initialize(Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA512);
break;
default:
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Unsupported hash mode " << (u32)cert.key_algorithm;
#endif
// fallback to md5, it will fail later
hash.initialize(Crypto::Hash::HashKind::MD5);
break;
}
hash.update(cert_data, cert_length);
auto fingerprint = hash.digest();
cert.fingerprint.grow(fingerprint.data_length());
cert.fingerprint.overwrite(0, fingerprint.immutable_data(), fingerprint.data_length());
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("Certificate fingerprint:");
print_buffer(cert.fingerprint);
#endif
}
return position;
}
}
Optional<Certificate> TLSv12::parse_asn1(ReadonlyBytes buffer, bool) const
{
// FIXME: Our ASN.1 parser is not quite up to the task of
// parsing this X.509 certificate, so for the
// time being, we will "parse" the certificate
// manually right here.
Certificate cert;
u32 fields[0xff];
_parse_asn1(m_context, cert, buffer.data(), buffer.size(), 1, fields, nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Certificate issued for " << cert.subject << " by " << cert.issuer_subject;
#endif
return cert;
}
ssize_t TLSv12::handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
{
ssize_t res = 0;
if (buffer.size() < 3) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("not enough certificate header data");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
u32 certificate_total_length = buffer[0] * 0x10000 + buffer[1] * 0x100 + buffer[2];
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "total length: " << certificate_total_length;
#endif
if (certificate_total_length <= 4)
return 3 * certificate_total_length;
res += 3;
if (certificate_total_length > buffer.size() - res) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("not enough data for claimed total cert length");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
size_t size = certificate_total_length;
size_t index = 0;
bool valid_certificate = false;
while (size > 0) {
++index;
if (buffer.size() - res < 3) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("not enough data for certificate length");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
size_t certificate_size = buffer[res] * 0x10000 + buffer[res + 1] * 0x100 + buffer[res + 2];
res += 3;
if (buffer.size() - res < certificate_size) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbgln("not enough data for certificate body");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
auto res_cert = res;
auto remaining = certificate_size;
size_t certificates_in_chain = 0;
do {
if (remaining <= 3) {
dbgln("Ran out of data");
break;
}
++certificates_in_chain;
if (buffer.size() < (size_t)res_cert + 3) {
dbg() << "not enough data to read cert size (" << buffer.size() << " < " << res_cert + 3 << ")";
break;
}
size_t certificate_size_specific = buffer[res_cert] * 0x10000 + buffer[res_cert + 1] * 0x100 + buffer[res_cert + 2];
res_cert += 3;
remaining -= 3;
if (certificate_size_specific > remaining) {
dbg() << "invalid certificate size (expected " << remaining << " but got " << certificate_size_specific << ")";
break;
}
remaining -= certificate_size_specific;
auto certificate = parse_asn1(buffer.slice(res_cert, certificate_size_specific), false);
if (certificate.has_value()) {
if (certificate.value().is_valid()) {
m_context.certificates.append(certificate.value());
valid_certificate = true;
}
}
res_cert += certificate_size_specific;
} while (remaining > 0);
if (remaining) {
dbg() << "extraneous " << remaining << " bytes left over after parsing certificates";
}
size -= certificate_size + 3;
res += certificate_size;
}
if (!valid_certificate)
return (i8)Error::UnsupportedCertificate;
if ((size_t)res != buffer.size())
dbg() << "some data left unread: " << (size_t)res << " bytes out of " << buffer.size();
return res;
}
void TLSv12::consume(ReadonlyBytes record)
{
if (m_context.critical_error) {
dbg() << "There has been a critical error (" << (i8)m_context.critical_error << "), refusing to continue";
return;
}
if (record.size() == 0) {
return;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Consuming " << record.size() << " bytes";
#endif
m_context.message_buffer.append(record.data(), record.size());
size_t index { 0 };
size_t buffer_length = m_context.message_buffer.size();
size_t size_offset { 3 }; // read the common record header
size_t header_size { 5 };
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "message buffer length " << buffer_length;
#endif
while (buffer_length >= 5) {
auto length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(u16*)m_context.message_buffer.offset_pointer(index + size_offset)) + header_size;
if (length > buffer_length) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Need more data: " << length << " | " << buffer_length;
#endif
break;
}
auto consumed = handle_message(m_context.message_buffer.bytes().slice(index, length));
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
if (consumed > 0)
dbg() << "consumed " << (size_t)consumed << " bytes";
else
dbg() << "error: " << (int)consumed;
#endif
if (consumed != (i8)Error::NeedMoreData) {
if (consumed < 0) {
dbg() << "Consumed an error: " << (int)consumed;
if (!m_context.critical_error)
m_context.critical_error = (i8)consumed;
m_context.error_code = (Error)consumed;
break;
}
} else {
continue;
}
index += length;
buffer_length -= length;
if (m_context.critical_error) {
dbgln("Broken connection");
m_context.error_code = Error::BrokenConnection;
break;
}
}
if (m_context.error_code != Error::NoError && m_context.error_code != Error::NeedMoreData) {
dbg() << "consume error: " << (i8)m_context.error_code;
m_context.message_buffer.clear();
return;
}
if (index) {
m_context.message_buffer = m_context.message_buffer.slice(index, m_context.message_buffer.size() - index);
}
}
void TLSv12::ensure_hmac(size_t digest_size, bool local)
{
if (local && m_hmac_local)
return;
if (!local && m_hmac_remote)
return;
auto hash_kind = Crypto::Hash::HashKind::None;
switch (digest_size) {
case Crypto::Hash::SHA1::DigestSize:
hash_kind = Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA1;
break;
case Crypto::Hash::SHA256::DigestSize:
hash_kind = Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA256;
break;
case Crypto::Hash::SHA512::DigestSize:
hash_kind = Crypto::Hash::HashKind::SHA512;
break;
default:
dbg() << "Failed to find a suitable hash for size " << digest_size;
break;
}
auto hmac = make<Crypto::Authentication::HMAC<Crypto::Hash::Manager>>(ReadonlyBytes { local ? m_context.crypto.local_mac : m_context.crypto.remote_mac, digest_size }, hash_kind);
if (local)
m_hmac_local = move(hmac);
else
m_hmac_remote = move(hmac);
}
bool Certificate::is_valid() const
{
auto now = Core::DateTime::now();
if (!not_before.is_empty()) {
if (now.is_before(not_before)) {
dbg() << "certificate expired (not yet valid, signed for " << not_before << ")";
return false;
}
}
if (!not_after.is_empty()) {
if (!now.is_before(not_after)) {
dbg() << "certificate expired (expiry date " << not_after << ")";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
void TLSv12::try_disambiguate_error() const
{
dbgln("Possible failure cause(s): ");
switch ((AlertDescription)m_context.critical_error) {
case AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure:
if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) {
dbg() << "- No cipher suite in common with " << m_context.SNI;
} else {
dbgln("- Unknown internal issue");
}
break;
case AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity:
dbg() << "- No cipher suite in common with " << m_context.SNI << " (the server is oh so secure)";
break;
case AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion:
dbgln("- The server refused to negotiate with TLS 1.2 :(");
break;
case AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage:
dbgln("- We sent an invalid message for the state we're in.");
break;
case AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC:
dbgln("- Bad MAC record from our side.");
dbgln("- Ciphertext wasn't an even multiple of the block length.");
dbgln("- Bad block cipher padding.");
dbgln("- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.");
break;
case AlertDescription::RecordOverflow:
dbgln("- Sent a ciphertext record which has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.");
dbgln("- Sent record decrypted to a compressed record that has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.");
dbgln("- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecompressionFailure:
dbgln("- We sent invalid input for decompression (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length)");
break;
case AlertDescription::IllegalParameter:
dbgln("- We sent a parameter in the handshake that is out of range or inconsistent with the other parameters.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecodeError:
dbgln("- The message we sent cannot be decoded because a field was out of range or the length was incorrect.");
dbgln("- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecryptError:
dbgln("- A handshake crypto operation failed. This includes signature verification and validating Finished.");
break;
case AlertDescription::AccessDenied:
dbgln("- The certificate is valid, but once access control was applied, the sender decided to stop negotiation.");
break;
case AlertDescription::InternalError:
dbgln("- No one knows, but it isn't a protocol failure.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed:
case AlertDescription::NoCertificate:
case AlertDescription::ExportRestriction:
dbgln("- No one knows, the server sent a non-compliant alert.");
break;
default:
dbgln("- No one knows.");
break;
}
}
void TLSv12::set_root_certificates(Vector<Certificate> certificates)
{
if (!m_context.root_ceritificates.is_empty())
dbgln("TLS warn: resetting root certificates!");
for (auto& cert : certificates) {
if (!cert.is_valid())
dbg() << "Certificate for " << cert.subject << " by " << cert.issuer_subject << " is invalid, things may or may not work!";
// FIXME: Figure out what we should do when our root certs are invalid.
}
m_context.root_ceritificates = move(certificates);
}
bool Context::verify_chain() const
{
const Vector<Certificate>* local_chain = nullptr;
if (is_server) {
dbgln("Unsupported: Server mode");
TODO();
} else {
local_chain = &certificates;
}
// FIXME: Actually verify the signature, instead of just checking the name.
HashMap<String, String> chain;
HashTable<String> roots;
// First, walk the root certs.
for (auto& cert : root_ceritificates) {
roots.set(cert.subject);
chain.set(cert.subject, cert.issuer_subject);
}
// Then, walk the local certs.
for (auto& cert : *local_chain) {
auto& issuer_unique_name = cert.issuer_unit.is_empty() ? cert.issuer_subject : cert.issuer_unit;
chain.set(cert.subject, issuer_unique_name);
}
// Then verify the chain.
for (auto& it : chain) {
if (it.key == it.value) { // Allow self-signed certificates.
if (!roots.contains(it.key))
dbg() << "Self-signed warning: Certificate for " << it.key << " is self-signed";
continue;
}
auto ref = chain.get(it.value);
if (!ref.has_value()) {
dbg() << "Certificate for " << it.key << " is not signed by anyone we trust (" << it.value << ")";
return false;
}
if (ref.value() == it.key) // Allow (but warn about) mutually recursively signed cert A <-> B.
dbg() << "Co-dependency warning: Certificate for " << ref.value() << " is issued by " << it.key << ", which itself is issued by " << ref.value();
}
return true;
}
static bool wildcard_matches(const StringView& host, const StringView& subject)
{
if (host.matches(subject))
return true;
if (subject.starts_with("*."))
return wildcard_matches(host, subject.substring_view(2));
return false;
}
Optional<size_t> TLSv12::verify_chain_and_get_matching_certificate(const StringView& host) const
{
if (m_context.certificates.is_empty() || !m_context.verify_chain())
return {};
if (host.is_empty())
return 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_context.certificates.size(); ++i) {
auto& cert = m_context.certificates[i];
if (wildcard_matches(host, cert.subject))
return i;
for (auto& san : cert.SAN) {
if (wildcard_matches(host, san))
return i;
}
}
return {};
}
TLSv12::TLSv12(Core::Object* parent, Version version)
: Core::Socket(Core::Socket::Type::TCP, parent)
{
m_context.version = version;
m_context.is_server = false;
m_context.tls_buffer = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(0);
#ifdef SOCK_NONBLOCK
int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
#else
int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
int option = 1;
ioctl(fd, FIONBIO, &option);
#endif
if (fd < 0) {
set_error(errno);
} else {
set_fd(fd);
set_mode(IODevice::ReadWrite);
set_error(0);
}
}
bool TLSv12::add_client_key(ReadonlyBytes certificate_pem_buffer, ReadonlyBytes rsa_key) // FIXME: This should not be bound to RSA
{
if (certificate_pem_buffer.is_empty() || rsa_key.is_empty()) {
return true;
}
auto decoded_certificate = Crypto::decode_pem(certificate_pem_buffer, 0);
if (decoded_certificate.is_empty()) {
dbgln("Certificate not PEM");
return false;
}
auto maybe_certificate = parse_asn1(decoded_certificate);
if (!maybe_certificate.has_value()) {
dbgln("Invalid certificate");
return false;
}
Crypto::PK::RSA rsa(rsa_key);
auto certificate = maybe_certificate.value();
certificate.private_key = rsa.private_key();
return add_client_key(certificate);
}
AK::Singleton<DefaultRootCACertificates> DefaultRootCACertificates::s_the;
DefaultRootCACertificates::DefaultRootCACertificates()
{
// FIXME: This might not be the best format, find a better way to represent CA certificates.
auto config = Core::ConfigFile::get_for_system("ca_certs");
for (auto& entity : config->groups()) {
Certificate cert;
cert.subject = entity;
cert.issuer_subject = config->read_entry(entity, "issuer_subject", entity);
cert.country = config->read_entry(entity, "country");
m_ca_certificates.append(move(cert));
}
}
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
* CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#pragma once
#include "Certificate.h"
#include <AK/IPv4Address.h>
#include <AK/WeakPtr.h>
#include <LibCore/Notifier.h>
#include <LibCore/Socket.h>
#include <LibCore/TCPSocket.h>
#include <LibCrypto/Authentication/HMAC.h>
#include <LibCrypto/BigInt/UnsignedBigInteger.h>
#include <LibCrypto/Cipher/AES.h>
#include <LibCrypto/Hash/HashManager.h>
#include <LibCrypto/PK/RSA.h>
#include <LibTLS/TLSPacketBuilder.h>
namespace TLS {
inline void print_buffer(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
{
for (size_t i { 0 }; i < buffer.size(); ++i)
dbgprintf("%02x ", buffer[i]);
dbgprintf("\n");
}
inline void print_buffer(const ByteBuffer& buffer)
{
print_buffer(buffer.bytes());
}
inline void print_buffer(const u8* buffer, size_t size)
{
print_buffer(ReadonlyBytes { buffer, size });
}
class Socket;
enum class CipherSuite {
Invalid = 0,
AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x1301,
AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x1302,
AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = 0x1304,
AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = 0x1305,
// We support these
RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x002F,
RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0035,
RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003C,
RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003D,
// TODO
RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x009C,
RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x009D,
};
#define ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTIONS \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(CloseNotify, 0) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(UnexpectedMessage, 10) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(BadRecordMAC, 20) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(DecryptionFailed, 21) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(RecordOverflow, 22) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(DecompressionFailure, 30) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(HandshakeFailure, 40) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(NoCertificate, 41) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(BadCertificate, 42) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(UnsupportedCertificate, 43) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(CertificateRevoked, 44) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(CertificateExpired, 45) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(CertificateUnknown, 46) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(IllegalParameter, 47) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(UnknownCA, 48) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(AccessDenied, 49) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(DecodeError, 50) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(DecryptError, 51) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(ExportRestriction, 60) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(ProtocolVersion, 70) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(InsufficientSecurity, 71) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(InternalError, 80) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(InappropriateFallback, 86) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(UserCanceled, 90) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(NoRenegotiation, 100) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(UnsupportedExtension, 110) \
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(NoError, 255)
enum class AlertDescription : u8 {
#define ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(name, value) name = value,
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTIONS
#undef ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION
};
constexpr static const char* alert_name(AlertDescription descriptor)
{
#define ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION(name, value) \
case AlertDescription::name: \
return #name;
switch (descriptor) {
ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTIONS
}
return "Unknown";
#undef ENUMERATE_ALERT_DESCRIPTION
}
enum class Error : i8 {
NoError = 0,
UnknownError = -1,
BrokenPacket = -2,
NotUnderstood = -3,
NoCommonCipher = -5,
UnexpectedMessage = -6,
CloseConnection = -7,
CompressionNotSupported = -8,
NotVerified = -9,
NotSafe = -10,
IntegrityCheckFailed = -11,
ErrorAlert = -12,
BrokenConnection = -13,
BadCertificate = -14,
UnsupportedCertificate = -15,
NoRenegotiation = -16,
FeatureNotSupported = -17,
DecryptionFailed = -20,
NeedMoreData = -21,
TimedOut = -22,
};
enum class AlertLevel : u8 {
Warning = 0x01,
Critical = 0x02
};
enum HandshakeType {
HelloRequest = 0x00,
ClientHello = 0x01,
ServerHello = 0x02,
HelloVerifyRequest = 0x03,
CertificateMessage = 0x0b,
ServerKeyExchange = 0x0c,
CertificateRequest = 0x0d,
ServerHelloDone = 0x0e,
CertificateVerify = 0x0f,
ClientKeyExchange = 0x10,
Finished = 0x14
};
enum class HandshakeExtension : u16 {
ServerName = 0x00,
ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation = 0x10,
SignatureAlgorithms = 0x0d,
};
enum class WritePacketStage {
Initial = 0,
ClientHandshake = 1,
ServerHandshake = 2,
Finished = 3,
};
enum class ConnectionStatus {
Disconnected,
Negotiating,
KeyExchange,
Renegotiating,
Established,
};
enum ClientVerificationStaus {
Verified,
VerificationNeeded,
};
struct Context {
String to_string() const;
bool verify() const;
bool verify_chain() const;
static void print_file(const StringView& fname);
u8 remote_random[32];
// To be predictable
u8 local_random[32];
u8 session_id[32];
u8 session_id_size { 0 };
CipherSuite cipher;
Version version;
bool is_server { false };
Vector<Certificate> certificates;
Certificate private_key;
Vector<Certificate> client_certificates;
ByteBuffer master_key;
ByteBuffer premaster_key;
u8 cipher_spec_set { 0 };
struct {
int created { 0 };
u8 remote_mac[32];
u8 local_mac[32];
u8 local_iv[16];
u8 remote_iv[16];
u8 local_aead_iv[4];
u8 remote_aead_iv[4];
} crypto;
Crypto::Hash::Manager handshake_hash;
ByteBuffer message_buffer;
u64 remote_sequence_number { 0 };
u64 local_sequence_number { 0 };
ConnectionStatus connection_status { ConnectionStatus::Disconnected };
u8 critical_error { 0 };
Error error_code { Error::NoError };
ByteBuffer tls_buffer;
ByteBuffer application_buffer;
bool is_child { false };
String SNI; // I hate your existence
u8 request_client_certificate { 0 };
ByteBuffer cached_handshake;
ClientVerificationStaus client_verified { Verified };
bool connection_finished { false };
// message flags
u8 handshake_messages[11] { 0 };
ByteBuffer user_data;
Vector<Certificate> root_ceritificates;
Vector<String> alpn;
StringView negotiated_alpn;
size_t send_retries { 0 };
time_t handshake_initiation_timestamp { 0 };
};
class TLSv12 : public Core::Socket {
C_OBJECT(TLSv12)
public:
ByteBuffer& write_buffer() { return m_context.tls_buffer; }
bool is_established() const { return m_context.connection_status == ConnectionStatus::Established; }
virtual bool connect(const String&, int) override;
void set_sni(const StringView& sni)
{
if (m_context.is_server || m_context.critical_error || m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Disconnected) {
dbgln("invalid state for set_sni");
return;
}
m_context.SNI = sni;
}
Optional<Certificate> parse_asn1(ReadonlyBytes, bool client_cert = false) const;
bool load_certificates(ReadonlyBytes pem_buffer);
bool load_private_key(ReadonlyBytes pem_buffer);
void set_root_certificates(Vector<Certificate>);
bool add_client_key(ReadonlyBytes certificate_pem_buffer, ReadonlyBytes key_pem_buffer);
bool add_client_key(Certificate certificate)
{
m_context.client_certificates.append(move(certificate));
return true;
}
ByteBuffer finish_build();
const StringView& alpn() const { return m_context.negotiated_alpn; }
void add_alpn(const StringView& alpn);
bool has_alpn(const StringView& alpn) const;
bool supports_cipher(CipherSuite suite) const
{
return suite == CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
|| suite == CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
|| suite == CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
|| suite == CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
|| suite == CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
}
bool supports_version(Version v) const
{
return v == Version::V12;
}
Optional<ByteBuffer> read();
ByteBuffer read(size_t max_size);
bool write(ReadonlyBytes);
void alert(AlertLevel, AlertDescription);
bool can_read_line() const { return m_context.application_buffer.size() && memchr(m_context.application_buffer.data(), '\n', m_context.application_buffer.size()); }
bool can_read() const { return m_context.application_buffer.size() > 0; }
String read_line(size_t max_size);
Function<void(TLSv12&)> on_tls_ready_to_read;
Function<void(TLSv12&)> on_tls_ready_to_write;
Function<void(AlertDescription)> on_tls_error;
Function<void()> on_tls_connected;
Function<void()> on_tls_finished;
Function<void(TLSv12&)> on_tls_certificate_request;
private:
explicit TLSv12(Core::Object* parent, Version version = Version::V12);
virtual bool common_connect(const struct sockaddr*, socklen_t) override;
void consume(ReadonlyBytes record);
ByteBuffer hmac_message(const ReadonlyBytes& buf, const Optional<ReadonlyBytes> buf2, size_t mac_length, bool local = false);
void ensure_hmac(size_t digest_size, bool local);
void update_packet(ByteBuffer& packet);
void update_hash(ReadonlyBytes in);
void write_packet(ByteBuffer& packet);
ByteBuffer build_client_key_exchange();
ByteBuffer build_server_key_exchange();
ByteBuffer build_hello();
ByteBuffer build_finished();
ByteBuffer build_certificate();
ByteBuffer build_done();
ByteBuffer build_alert(bool critical, u8 code);
ByteBuffer build_change_cipher_spec();
ByteBuffer build_verify_request();
void build_random(PacketBuilder&);
bool flush();
void write_into_socket();
void read_from_socket();
bool check_connection_state(bool read);
ssize_t handle_hello(ReadonlyBytes, WritePacketStage&);
ssize_t handle_finished(ReadonlyBytes, WritePacketStage&);
ssize_t handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes);
ssize_t handle_server_key_exchange(ReadonlyBytes);
ssize_t handle_server_hello_done(ReadonlyBytes);
ssize_t handle_verify(ReadonlyBytes);
ssize_t handle_payload(ReadonlyBytes);
ssize_t handle_message(ReadonlyBytes);
ssize_t handle_random(ReadonlyBytes);
size_t asn1_length(ReadonlyBytes, size_t* octets);
void pseudorandom_function(Bytes output, ReadonlyBytes secret, const u8* label, size_t label_length, ReadonlyBytes seed, ReadonlyBytes seed_b);
size_t key_length() const
{
switch (m_context.cipher) {
case CipherSuite::AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_128_CCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::Invalid:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
default:
return 128 / 8;
case CipherSuite::AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
return 256 / 8;
}
}
size_t mac_length() const
{
switch (m_context.cipher) {
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
return Crypto::Hash::SHA1::digest_size();
case CipherSuite::AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
return Crypto::Hash::SHA512::digest_size();
case CipherSuite::AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_128_CCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::Invalid:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
default:
return Crypto::Hash::SHA256::digest_size();
}
}
size_t iv_length() const
{
switch (m_context.cipher) {
case CipherSuite::AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_128_CCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::Invalid:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
default:
return 16;
case CipherSuite::AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
return 8; // 4 bytes of fixed IV, 8 random (nonce) bytes, 4 bytes for counter
// GCM specifically asks us to transmit only the nonce, the counter is zero
// and the fixed IV is derived from the premaster key.
}
}
bool is_aead() const
{
switch (m_context.cipher) {
case CipherSuite::AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case CipherSuite::RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bool expand_key();
bool compute_master_secret(size_t length);
Optional<size_t> verify_chain_and_get_matching_certificate(const StringView& host) const;
void try_disambiguate_error() const;
Context m_context;
OwnPtr<Crypto::Authentication::HMAC<Crypto::Hash::Manager>> m_hmac_local;
OwnPtr<Crypto::Authentication::HMAC<Crypto::Hash::Manager>> m_hmac_remote;
struct {
OwnPtr<Crypto::Cipher::AESCipher::CBCMode> cbc;
OwnPtr<Crypto::Cipher::AESCipher::GCMMode> gcm;
} m_aes_local, m_aes_remote;
bool m_has_scheduled_write_flush { false };
i32 m_max_wait_time_for_handshake_in_seconds { 10 };
RefPtr<Core::Timer> m_handshake_timeout_timer;
};
namespace Constants {
constexpr static const u32 version_id[] { 1, 1, 1, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 pk_id[] { 1, 1, 7, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 serial_id[] { 1, 1, 2, 1, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 issurer_id[] { 1, 1, 4, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 owner_id[] { 1, 1, 6, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 validity_id[] { 1, 1, 5, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 algorithm_id[] { 1, 1, 3, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 sign_id[] { 1, 3, 2, 1, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 priv_id[] { 1, 4, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 priv_der_id[] { 1, 3, 1, 0 };
constexpr static const u32 ecc_priv_id[] { 1, 2, 0 };
constexpr static const u8 country_oid[] { 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 state_oid[] { 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 location_oid[] { 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 entity_oid[] { 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 subject_oid[] { 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 unit_oid[] { 0x55, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 san_oid[] { 0x55, 0x1D, 0x11, 0x00 };
constexpr static const u8 ocsp_oid[] { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x00 };
static constexpr const u8 RSA_SIGN_RSA_OID[] = { 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00 };
static constexpr const u8 RSA_SIGN_MD5_OID[] = { 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x00 };
static constexpr const u8 RSA_SIGN_SHA1_OID[] = { 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00 };
static constexpr const u8 RSA_SIGN_SHA256_OID[] = { 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x00 };
static constexpr const u8 RSA_SIGN_SHA384_OID[] = { 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x00 };
static constexpr const u8 RSA_SIGN_SHA512_OID[] = { 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x00 };
}
}