RGBCube/serenity
1
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/RGBCube/serenity synced 2025-07-24 12:37:43 +00:00
Code Issues Activity Actions

LibTLS: Add more TLS 1.2 error descriptions

Browse source 
Adds more TLS 1.2 error descriptions according to the specification:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2.2

This changes the DecryptionFailed description, as the specification
says that this alert should NEVER be sent by a compliant server.
This commit is contained in:
Luke 2020-05-26 23:27:41 +01:00 • committed by Andreas Kling
parent c700a30ce8
commit 8e6df3949d
1 changed files with 41 additions and 4 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

45
Libraries/LibTLS/TLSv12.cpp
View file

@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ bool Certificate::is_valid() const
void TLSv12::try_disambiguate_error() const void TLSv12::try_disambiguate_error() const
{ {
dbg() << "Possible failure cause: "; dbg() << "Possible failure cause(s): ";
switch ((AlertDescription)m_context.critical_error) { switch ((AlertDescription)m_context.critical_error) {
case AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure: case AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure:
if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) { if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) {
@ -648,12 +648,49 @@ void TLSv12::try_disambiguate_error() const
case AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity: case AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity:
dbg() << "- No cipher suite in common with " << m_context.SNI << " (the server is oh so secure)"; dbg() << "- No cipher suite in common with " << m_context.SNI << " (the server is oh so secure)";
break; break;
case AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion:
dbg() << "- The server refused to negotiate with TLS 1.2 :(";
break;
case AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage:
dbg() << "- We sent an invalid message for the state we're in.";
break;
case AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC:
dbg() << "- Bad MAC record from our side.";
dbg() << "- Ciphertext wasn't an even multiple of the block length.";
dbg() << "- Bad block cipher padding.";
dbg() << "- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.";
break;
case AlertDescription::RecordOverflow:
dbg() << "- Sent a ciphertext record which has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.";
dbg() << "- Sent record decrypted to a compressed record that has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.";
dbg() << "- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.";
break;
case AlertDescription::DecompressionFailure:
dbg() << "- We sent invalid input for decompression (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length)";
break;
case AlertDescription::IllegalParameter:
dbg() << "- We sent a parameter in the handshake that is out of range or inconsistent with the other parameters.";
break;
case AlertDescription::DecodeError:
dbg() << "- The message we sent cannot be decoded because a field was out of range or the length was incorrect.";
dbg() << "- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.";
break;
case AlertDescription::DecryptError:
dbg() << "- A handshake crypto operation failed. This includes signature verification and validating Finished.";
break;
case AlertDescription::AccessDenied:
dbg() << "- The certificate is valid, but once access control was applied, the sender decided to stop negotiation.";
break;
case AlertDescription::InternalError:
dbg() << "- No one knows, but it isn't a protocol failure.";
break;
case AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed: case AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed:
dbg() << "- Bad MAC record from our side"; case AlertDescription::NoCertificate:
dbg() << "- Bad block cipher padding"; case AlertDescription::ExportRestriction:
dbg() << "- No one knows, the server sent a non-compliant alert.";
break; break;
default: default:
dbg() << "- No one knows"; dbg() << "- No one knows.";
break; break;
} }
} }