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Base: Do a little copy-editing in Mitigations(7)

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Andreas Kling 2021-02-20 09:53:49 +01:00
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Base/usr/share/man/man7/Mitigations.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
## Name
Mitigations - Security mitigations implemented by SerenityOS.
Mitigations - Security mitigations implemented by SerenityOS
## Description
@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ to collect and describe the mitigations in one centralized place.
### SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection)
[Supervisor Mode Execution Protection](https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/best-practices/related-intel-security-features-technologies) is a feature
of Intel CPUs which allows the kernel to instruct the CPU
to disable execution of code residing in user space.
[Supervisor Mode Execution Protection](https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/best-practices/related-intel-security-features-technologies) is an Intel CPU feature which prevents execution
of userspace code with kernel privileges.
It was enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/8602fa5b49aa4e2b039764a14698f0baa3ad0532):
```
@ -29,9 +28,9 @@ Kernel: Enable x86 SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection)
### SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
[Supervisor Mode Access Prevention](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervisor_Mode_Access_Prevention) compliments
SMEP, it allows a kernel to set user-space memory mappings
that will cause a trap when accessing user-space memory.
[Supervisor Mode Access Prevention](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervisor_Mode_Access_Prevention)
compliments SMEP by also guarding read/write access to
userspace memory while executing in kernel mode.
It was enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/9eef39d68a99c5e29099ae4eb4a56934b35eecde):
@ -45,10 +44,9 @@ Kernel: Start implementing x86 SMAP support
### Pledge
[pledge](https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=143725996614627&w=2) is a mitigation which originated from OpenBSD (originally named tame).
It enables a program to voluntarily restrict its access to the kernel's syscall
surface area. The allows the program to reduce the potential attack surface
available if the program in question was exploited.
[pledge](https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=143725996614627&w=2) is a mitigation which originated from OpenBSD.
It allows a program to voluntarily restrict its access to system calls
and kernel facilities.
It was first added in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/41c504a33becea8aa9b437cd3c0dc312b2bf1fe9),
and the majority of programs were enlightened later:
@ -63,9 +61,8 @@ Kernel: Add pledge() syscall :^)
### Unveil
[unveil](https://lwn.net/Articles/767137/) is a mitigation which originated from OpenBSD.
It enables a program to voluntarily restrict its access to the filesystem.
This reduces the potential surface area available if the program in question was exploited.
[unveil](https://lwn.net/Articles/767137/) is a mitigation originating from OpenBSD.
It allows a program to voluntarily restrict its access to the filesystem.
It was first added in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/0569123ad7cb9c54df724c2bb85933ea3cf97134),
and the majority of programs were enlightened later:
@ -83,7 +80,7 @@ Kernel: Add a basic implementation of unveil()
[syscall call-from verification](https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=157488907117170&w=2) is
a mitigation which originated from OpenBSD.
In short the kernel checks that all syscalls originate
from the address of the systems libc. This makes attacks
from the address of the system's libc. This makes attacks
on OpenBSD more difficult as they random-relink their libc
on boot, which makes finding syscall stubs in libc difficult
for attackers. On serenity it is mostly just an inconvenience,
@ -103,9 +100,9 @@ Kernel: Add a way to specify which memory regions can make syscalls
[Post-init read-only memory](https://lwn.net/Articles/666550/) is
a mitigation which originated from the Linux Kernel.
It tracks data that is initialized once during kernel boot and never
touched again, post kernel initialization the memory is marked
read only to protect it from potentially being modified by exploits.
It tracks data that is initialized during kernel boot and never
changed again. Post kernel initialization, the memory is marked
read-only to protect it from potentially being modified by exploits.
It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/d8013c60bb52756788e747183572067d6e3f204a)
and other kernel data structures were enlightened later:
@ -120,11 +117,10 @@ Kernel: Add mechanism to make some memory read-only after init finishes
### KUBSAN (Kernel Undefined Behavior Sanitizer)
Undefined behavior sanitizer is a dynamic analysis tool, implemented in GCC,
UndefinedBehaviorSANitizer is a dynamic analysis tool, implemented in GCC,
which instruments generated code to flag undefined behavior at runtime.
It can find various issues including, overflows, out of bounds array
accesses, type corruption, and many more. Undefined behavior bugs can often
be exploited, KUBSAN allows developers to catch them during testing instead.
It can find various issues, including integer overflows, out-of-bounds array
accesses, type corruption, and more.
It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/d44be968938ecf95023351a358c43c4957638d87):
```
@ -135,11 +131,11 @@ Date: Fri Feb 5 19:44:26 2021 +0100
Kernel: KUBSAN! (Kernel Undefined Behavior SANitizer) :^)
```
### Kernel Unmap after init
### Kernel unmap-after-init
Umap after init allows the kerenel to remove functions which contain potentially
Umap-after-init allows the kerenel to remove functions which contain potentially
dangerous [ROP gadgets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return-oriented_programming)
from kernel memory after they have been used and are no longer needed. Notably the
from kernel memory after we've booted up and they are no longer needed. Notably the
`write_cr4(..)` function used to control processor features like the SMEP/SMAP bits
in the CR4 register, and the `write_cr0(..)` function used to control processor features
like write protection, etc.
@ -156,17 +152,16 @@ Date: Fri Feb 19 18:21:54 2021 +0100
Kernel: Add .unmap_after_init section for code we don't need after init
```
### Reloaction Read-Only (RELRO)
### Relocation Read-Only (RELRO)
[RELRO](https://hockeyinjune.medium.com/relro-relocation-read-only-c8d0933faef3) is a mitigation
in the linker and loader that hardens the data sections of an ELF binary.
When linked with the relro option the resulting binary will have new sections emitted which
contain the relro data (`.data.rel.ro` and `.data.rel.ro.local`). The sections will be placed
into a program segment of type `PT_GNU_RELRO` which contains the relro sections.
The loader can then detect the `PT_GNU_RELRO` segment and then make the regions read only after
relocations have been performed.
This mitigates attacks which for example attempt to overwrite the [Global Offset Table (GOT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Offset_Table).
When enabled, it segregates function pointers resolved by the dynamic loader
into a separate section of the runtie executable memory, and allows the loader
to make that memory read-only before passing control to the main executable.
This prevents attackers from overwriting the [Global Offset Table (GOT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Offset_Table).
It was first enabled for executables in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/fa4c249425a65076ca04a3cb0c173d49472796fb):
```
@ -177,7 +172,7 @@ Date: Thu Feb 18 18:43:20 2021 +0100
LibELF+Userland: Enable RELRO for all userland executables :^)
```
Shared libraries were enabled in a folow up [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/713b3b36be4f659e58e253b6c830509898dbd2fa):
Shared libraries were enabled in a follow-up [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/713b3b36be4f659e58e253b6c830509898dbd2fa):
```
commit 713b3b36be4f659e58e253b6c830509898dbd2fa
Author: Andreas Kling <kling@serenityos.org>
@ -190,8 +185,8 @@ DynamicLoader+Userland: Enable RELRO for shared libraries as well :^)
The GCC compiler option [`-fstack-clash-protection`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html)
is a mitigation which helps prevent [stack clash](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2017/06/19/the-stack-clash)
style attacks by generating code which allocates and immediately accesses one page of stack at a time.
This prevents attackers from creating situations in which stack allocations jump over a guard page into whatever lies after.
style attacks by generating code that probes the stack in page-sized increments to ensure a fault is provoked.
This prevents attackers from using a large stack allocation to "jump over" the stack guard page into adjacent memory.
It was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/7142562310e631156d1f64aff22f068ae2c48a5e):
```
@ -209,8 +204,8 @@ This family of flags enables [buffer overflow protection](https://en.wikipedia.o
to mitigate [stack-smashing attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow).
The compiler implements the mitigation by storing a canary value randomized on program startup into the preamble of all
functions. Code is then generated to check that stack canary on function return and crash if the value has been changed,
and hence a stack corruption has been detected.
functions. Code is then generated to validate that stack canary on function return and crash if the value has been changed
(and hence a stack corruption has been detected.)
`-fstack-protector` was first enabled in the following [commit](https://github.com/SerenityOS/serenity/commit/842716a0b5eceb8db31416cd643720c1037032b2):