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Everywhere: Replace a bundle of dbg with dbgln.

These changes are arbitrarily divided into multiple commits to make it
easier to find potentially introduced bugs with git bisect.Everything:

The modifications in this commit were automatically made using the
following command:

    find . -name '*.cpp' -exec sed -i -E 's/dbg\(\) << ("[^"{]*");/dbgln\(\1\);/' {} \;
This commit is contained in:
asynts 2021-01-09 18:51:44 +01:00 committed by Andreas Kling
parent 40b8e21115
commit 938e5c7719
95 changed files with 331 additions and 331 deletions

View file

@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static bool _set_algorithm(CertificateKeyAlgorithm& algorithm, const u8* value,
{
if (length == 7) {
// Elliptic Curve pubkey
dbg() << "Cert.algorithm: EC, unsupported";
dbgln("Cert.algorithm: EC, unsupported");
return false;
}
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static bool _set_algorithm(CertificateKeyAlgorithm& algorithm, const u8* value,
}
if (length != 9) {
dbg() << "Invalid certificate algorithm";
dbgln("Invalid certificate algorithm");
return false;
}
@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static ssize_t _parse_asn1(const Context& context, Certificate& cert, const u8*
while (position < size) {
size_t start_position = position;
if (size - position < 2) {
dbg() << "not enough data for certificate size";
dbgln("not enough data for certificate size");
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
u8 first = buffer[position++];
@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static ssize_t _parse_asn1(const Context& context, Certificate& cert, const u8*
if (octets > 4 || octets > size - position) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "could not read the certificate";
dbgln("could not read the certificate");
#endif
return position;
}
@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static ssize_t _parse_asn1(const Context& context, Certificate& cert, const u8*
position += octets;
if (size - position < length) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "not enough data for sequence";
dbgln("not enough data for sequence");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static ssize_t _parse_asn1(const Context& context, Certificate& cert, const u8*
cert.fingerprint.grow(fingerprint.data_length());
cert.fingerprint.overwrite(0, fingerprint.immutable_data(), fingerprint.data_length());
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "Certificate fingerprint:";
dbgln("Certificate fingerprint:");
print_buffer(cert.fingerprint);
#endif
}
@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ ssize_t TLSv12::handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
if (buffer.size() < 3) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "not enough certificate header data";
dbgln("not enough certificate header data");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ ssize_t TLSv12::handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
if (certificate_total_length > buffer.size() - res) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "not enough data for claimed total cert length";
dbgln("not enough data for claimed total cert length");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ ssize_t TLSv12::handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
++index;
if (buffer.size() - res < 3) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "not enough data for certificate length";
dbgln("not enough data for certificate length");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ ssize_t TLSv12::handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
if (buffer.size() - res < certificate_size) {
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
dbg() << "not enough data for certificate body";
dbgln("not enough data for certificate body");
#endif
return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
}
@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ ssize_t TLSv12::handle_certificate(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
do {
if (remaining <= 3) {
dbg() << "Ran out of data";
dbgln("Ran out of data");
break;
}
++certificates_in_chain;
@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ void TLSv12::consume(ReadonlyBytes record)
index += length;
buffer_length -= length;
if (m_context.critical_error) {
dbg() << "Broken connection";
dbgln("Broken connection");
m_context.error_code = Error::BrokenConnection;
break;
}
@ -674,61 +674,61 @@ bool Certificate::is_valid() const
void TLSv12::try_disambiguate_error() const
{
dbg() << "Possible failure cause(s): ";
dbgln("Possible failure cause(s): ");
switch ((AlertDescription)m_context.critical_error) {
case AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure:
if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) {
dbg() << "- No cipher suite in common with " << m_context.SNI;
} else {
dbg() << "- Unknown internal issue";
dbgln("- Unknown internal issue");
}
break;
case AlertDescription::InsufficientSecurity:
dbg() << "- No cipher suite in common with " << m_context.SNI << " (the server is oh so secure)";
break;
case AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion:
dbg() << "- The server refused to negotiate with TLS 1.2 :(";
dbgln("- The server refused to negotiate with TLS 1.2 :(");
break;
case AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage:
dbg() << "- We sent an invalid message for the state we're in.";
dbgln("- We sent an invalid message for the state we're in.");
break;
case AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC:
dbg() << "- Bad MAC record from our side.";
dbg() << "- Ciphertext wasn't an even multiple of the block length.";
dbg() << "- Bad block cipher padding.";
dbg() << "- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.";
dbgln("- Bad MAC record from our side.");
dbgln("- Ciphertext wasn't an even multiple of the block length.");
dbgln("- Bad block cipher padding.");
dbgln("- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.");
break;
case AlertDescription::RecordOverflow:
dbg() << "- Sent a ciphertext record which has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.";
dbg() << "- Sent record decrypted to a compressed record that has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.";
dbg() << "- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.";
dbgln("- Sent a ciphertext record which has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.");
dbgln("- Sent record decrypted to a compressed record that has a length bigger than 18432 bytes.");
dbgln("- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecompressionFailure:
dbg() << "- We sent invalid input for decompression (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length)";
dbgln("- We sent invalid input for decompression (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length)");
break;
case AlertDescription::IllegalParameter:
dbg() << "- We sent a parameter in the handshake that is out of range or inconsistent with the other parameters.";
dbgln("- We sent a parameter in the handshake that is out of range or inconsistent with the other parameters.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecodeError:
dbg() << "- The message we sent cannot be decoded because a field was out of range or the length was incorrect.";
dbg() << "- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.";
dbgln("- The message we sent cannot be decoded because a field was out of range or the length was incorrect.");
dbgln("- If both sides are compliant, the only cause is messages being corrupted in the network.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecryptError:
dbg() << "- A handshake crypto operation failed. This includes signature verification and validating Finished.";
dbgln("- A handshake crypto operation failed. This includes signature verification and validating Finished.");
break;
case AlertDescription::AccessDenied:
dbg() << "- The certificate is valid, but once access control was applied, the sender decided to stop negotiation.";
dbgln("- The certificate is valid, but once access control was applied, the sender decided to stop negotiation.");
break;
case AlertDescription::InternalError:
dbg() << "- No one knows, but it isn't a protocol failure.";
dbgln("- No one knows, but it isn't a protocol failure.");
break;
case AlertDescription::DecryptionFailed:
case AlertDescription::NoCertificate:
case AlertDescription::ExportRestriction:
dbg() << "- No one knows, the server sent a non-compliant alert.";
dbgln("- No one knows, the server sent a non-compliant alert.");
break;
default:
dbg() << "- No one knows.";
dbgln("- No one knows.");
break;
}
}
@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ void TLSv12::try_disambiguate_error() const
void TLSv12::set_root_certificates(Vector<Certificate> certificates)
{
if (!m_context.root_ceritificates.is_empty())
dbg() << "TLS warn: resetting root certificates!";
dbgln("TLS warn: resetting root certificates!");
for (auto& cert : certificates) {
if (!cert.is_valid())
@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ bool Context::verify_chain() const
{
const Vector<Certificate>* local_chain = nullptr;
if (is_server) {
dbg() << "Unsupported: Server mode";
dbgln("Unsupported: Server mode");
TODO();
} else {
local_chain = &certificates;
@ -853,13 +853,13 @@ bool TLSv12::add_client_key(ReadonlyBytes certificate_pem_buffer, ReadonlyBytes
}
auto decoded_certificate = Crypto::decode_pem(certificate_pem_buffer, 0);
if (decoded_certificate.is_empty()) {
dbg() << "Certificate not PEM";
dbgln("Certificate not PEM");
return false;
}
auto maybe_certificate = parse_asn1(decoded_certificate);
if (!maybe_certificate.has_value()) {
dbg() << "Invalid certificate";
dbgln("Invalid certificate");
return false;
}