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Kernel: Make copy_to/from_user safe and remove unnecessary checks

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Since the CPU already does almost all necessary validation steps
for us, we don't really need to attempt to do this. Doing it
ourselves doesn't really work very reliably, because we'd have to
account for other processors modifying virtual memory, and we'd
have to account for e.g. pages not being able to be allocated
due to insufficient resources.

So change the copy_to/from_user (and associated helper functions)
to use the new safe_memcpy, which will return whether it succeeded
or not. The only manual validation step needed (which the CPU
can't perform for us) is making sure the pointers provided by user
mode aren't pointing to kernel mappings.

To make it easier to read/write from/to either kernel or user mode
data add the UserOrKernelBuffer helper class, which will internally
either use copy_from/to_user or directly memcpy, or pass the data
through directly using a temporary buffer on the stack.

Last but not least we need to keep syscall params trivial as we
need to copy them from/to user mode using copy_from/to_user.
This commit is contained in:
Tom 2020-09-11 21:11:07 -06:00 • committed by Andreas Kling
parent 7d1b8417bd
commit c8d9f1b9c9
149 changed files with 1585 additions and 1244 deletions
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35
Kernel/Syscalls/ptrace.cpp
View file

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <AK/ScopeGuard.h>
#include <Kernel/Process.h>
#include <Kernel/Ptrace.h>
#include <Kernel/VM/MemoryManager.h>
@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ int Process::sys$ptrace(Userspace<const Syscall::SC_ptrace_params*> user_params)
{
REQUIRE_PROMISE(proc);
Syscall::SC_ptrace_params params;
if (!validate_read_and_copy_typed(&params, user_params))
if (!copy_from_user(&params, user_params))
return -EFAULT;
auto result = Ptrace::handle_syscall(params, *this);
return result.is_error() ? result.error() : result.value();
@ -63,28 +64,21 @@ bool Process::has_tracee_thread(ProcessID tracer_pid) const
KResultOr<u32> Process::peek_user_data(Userspace<const u32*> address)
{
if (!MM.validate_user_read(*this, VirtualAddress(address), sizeof(u32))) {
dbg() << "Invalid address for peek_user_data: " << address.ptr();
return KResult(-EFAULT);
}
uint32_t result;
// This function can be called from the context of another
// process that called PT_PEEK
ProcessPagingScope scope(*this);
copy_from_user(&result, address);
if (!copy_from_user(&result, address)) {
dbg() << "Invalid address for peek_user_data: " << address.ptr();
return KResult(-EFAULT);
}
return result;
}
KResult Process::poke_user_data(Userspace<u32*> address, u32 data)
{
// We validate for read (rather than write) because PT_POKE can write to readonly pages.
// So we effectively only care that the poke operation is trying to write to user pages.
if (!MM.validate_user_read(*this, VirtualAddress(address), sizeof(u32))) {
dbg() << "Invalid address for poke_user_data: " << address.ptr();
return KResult(-EFAULT);
}
ProcessPagingScope scope(*this);
Range range = { VirtualAddress(address), sizeof(u32) };
auto* region = find_region_containing(range);
@ -97,18 +91,23 @@ KResult Process::poke_user_data(Userspace<u32*> address, u32 data)
region->set_shared(false);
}
const bool was_writable = region->is_writable();
if (!was_writable) //TODO refactor into scopeguard
if (!was_writable)
{
region->set_writable(true);
region->remap();
}
ScopeGuard rollback([&]() {
if (!was_writable) {
region->set_writable(false);
region->remap();
}
});
copy_to_user(address, &data);
if (!was_writable) {
region->set_writable(false);
region->remap();
if (!copy_to_user(address, &data)) {
dbg() << "Invalid address for poke_user_data: " << address.ptr();
return KResult(-EFAULT);
}
return KResult(KSuccess);
}