From cedec9751a1a0ac1d1eb517ac3ff1c2ca0bf12b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de>
Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2022 19:59:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Kernel: Decrease the amount of address space offset
 randomization

This is basically unchanged since the beginning of 2020, which is a year
before we had proper ASLR.

Now that we have a proper ASLR implementation, we can turn this down a
bit, as it is no longer our only protection against predictable dynamic
loader addresses, and it actually obstructs the default loading address
of x86_64 quite frequently.
---
 Kernel/Memory/AddressSpace.cpp | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Kernel/Memory/AddressSpace.cpp b/Kernel/Memory/AddressSpace.cpp
index 50cd70eb73..3c4b801313 100644
--- a/Kernel/Memory/AddressSpace.cpp
+++ b/Kernel/Memory/AddressSpace.cpp
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ErrorOr<NonnullOwnPtr<AddressSpace>> AddressSpace::try_create(AddressSpace const
             return parent->m_region_tree.total_range();
         constexpr FlatPtr userspace_range_base = USER_RANGE_BASE;
         FlatPtr const userspace_range_ceiling = USER_RANGE_CEILING;
-        size_t random_offset = (get_fast_random<u8>() % 32 * MiB) & PAGE_MASK;
+        size_t random_offset = (get_fast_random<u8>() % 2 * MiB) & PAGE_MASK;
         FlatPtr base = userspace_range_base + random_offset;
         return VirtualRange(VirtualAddress { base }, userspace_range_ceiling - base);
     }();