This removes some hard references to the toolchain, some unnecessary
uses of an external install command, and disables a -Werror flag (for
the time being) - only if run inside serenity.
With this, we can build and link the kernel :^)
This required a bit of rearchitecture, as pthread_atfork() required a
mutex, and duplicating a mutex impl for it was silly.
As such, this patch moves some standalone bits of pthread into LibC and
uses those to implement atfork().
It should be noted that for programs that don't use atfork(), this
mechanism only costs two atomic loads (as opposed to the normal mutex
lock+unlock) :^)
This achieves two things:
- Programs can now intentionally perform arbitrary syscalls by calling
syscall(). This allows us to work on things like syscall fuzzing.
- It restricts the ability of userspace to make syscalls to a single
4KB page of code. In order to call the kernel directly, an attacker
must now locate this page and call through it.
