This also changes the UnveilState to Dropped when the path unveil() is
called for already has a node.
This fixes a bug where unveiling "/" would previously keep the
UnveilState as None, which meant that everything was still accessible
until unveil() was called with any non-root path (or nullptr).
When changing the unveil permissions of a preexisting node, we need to
make sure that any intermediate nodes that were created before and
should inherit permissions from the updated node are updated properly.
This fixes the following bug:
unveil("/home/anon/Documents", "r");
unveil("/home", "r");
Now there was a intermediate node for "/home/anon" which still had no
permission, even though it should have inherited the permissions from
"/home".
This fixes a bug where unveiling a subdirectory of an already unveiled
path would sometimes be allowed and sometimes not (depending on what
other unveil calls have been made).
Now, it is always allowed to unveil a subdirectory of an already
unveiled directory, even if it has higher permissions.
This removes the need for the permissions_inherited_from_root flag in
UnveilMetadata, so it has been removed.
SPDX License Identifiers are a more compact / standardized
way of representing file license information.
See: https://spdx.dev/resources/use/#identifiers
This was done with the `ambr` search and replace tool.
ambr --no-parent-ignore --key-from-file --rep-from-file key.txt rep.txt *
(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
This can happen when an unveil follows another with a path that is a
sub-path of the other one:
```c++
unveil("/home/anon/.config/whoa.ini", "rw");
unveil("/home/anon", "r"); // this would fail, as "/home/anon" inherits
// the permissions of "/", which is None.
```
This is a new "browse" permission that lets you open (and subsequently list
contents of) directories underneath the path, but not regular files or any other
types of files.
This addresses the issue first enountered in #3644. If a path is
first unveiled with "c" permissions, we should NOT return ENOENT
if the node does not exist on the disk, as the program will most
likely be creating it at a later time.
Since the CPU already does almost all necessary validation steps
for us, we don't really need to attempt to do this. Doing it
ourselves doesn't really work very reliably, because we'd have to
account for other processors modifying virtual memory, and we'd
have to account for e.g. pages not being able to be allocated
due to insufficient resources.
So change the copy_to/from_user (and associated helper functions)
to use the new safe_memcpy, which will return whether it succeeded
or not. The only manual validation step needed (which the CPU
can't perform for us) is making sure the pointers provided by user
mode aren't pointing to kernel mappings.
To make it easier to read/write from/to either kernel or user mode
data add the UserOrKernelBuffer helper class, which will internally
either use copy_from/to_user or directly memcpy, or pass the data
through directly using a temporary buffer on the stack.
Last but not least we need to keep syscall params trivial as we
need to copy them from/to user mode using copy_from/to_user.
This is something I've been meaning to do for a long time, and here we
finally go. This patch moves all sys$foo functions out of Process.cpp
and into files in Kernel/Syscalls/.
It's not exactly one syscall per file (although it could be, but I got
a bit tired of the repetitive work here..)
This makes hacking on individual syscalls a lot less painful since you
don't have to rebuild nearly as much code every time. I'm also hopeful
that this makes it easier to understand individual syscalls. :^)
