The Raspberry Pi hardware doesn't support a proper software-initiated
shutdown, so this instead uses the watchdog to reboot to a special
partition which the firmware interprets as an immediate halt on
shutdown. When running under Qemu, this causes the emulator to exit.
`process.fds()` is protected by a Mutex, which causes issues when we try
to acquire it while holding a Spinlock. Since nothing seems to use this
value, let's just remove it entirely for now.
To do this we also need to get rid of LockRefPtrs in the USB code as
well.
Most of the SysFS nodes are statically generated during boot and are not
mutated afterwards.
The same goes for general device code - once we generate the appropriate
SysFS nodes, we almost never mutate the node pointers afterwards, making
locking unnecessary.
This is done with 2 major steps:
1. Remove JailManagement singleton and use a structure that resembles
what we have with the Process object. This is required later for the
second step in this commit, but on its own, is a major change that
removes this clunky singleton that had no real usage by itself.
2. Use IntrusiveLists to keep references to Process objects in the same
Jail so it will be much more straightforward to iterate on this kind
of objects when needed. Previously we locked the entire Process list
and we did a simple pointer comparison to check if the checked
Process we iterate on is in the same Jail or not, which required
taking multiple Spinlocks in a very clumsy and heavyweight way.
This subdirectory is meant to hold all constant data related to the
kernel. This means that this data is never meant to updated and is
relevant from system boot to system shutdown.
Move the inodes of "load_base", "cmdline" and "system_mode" to that
directory. All nodes under this new subdirectory are generated during
boot, and therefore don't require calling kmalloc each time we need to
read them. Locking is also not necessary, because these nodes and their
data are completely static once being generated.
This replaces manually grabbing the thread's main lock.
This lets us remove the `get_thread_name` and `set_thread_name` syscalls
from the big lock. :^)
We really don't want callers of this function to accidentally change
the jail, or even worse - remove the Process from an attached jail.
To ensure this never happens, we can just declare this method as const
so nobody can mutate it this way.
Use this helper function in various places to replace the old code of
acquiring the SpinlockProtected<RefPtr<Jail>> of a Process to do that
validation.
Only do so after a brief check if we are in a Jail or not. This fixes
SMP, because apparently it is crashing when calling try_generate()
from the SysFSGlobalInformation::refresh_data method, so the fix for
this is to simply not do that inside the Process' Jail spinlock scope,
because otherwise we will simply have a possible flow of taking
multiple conflicting Spinlocks (in the wrong order multiple times), for
the SysFSOverallProcesses generation code:
Process::current().jail(), and then Process::for_each_in_same_jail being
called, we take Process::all_instances(), and Process::current().jail()
again.
Therefore, we should at the very least eliminate the first taking of the
Process::current().jail() spinlock, in the refresh_data method of the
SysFSGlobalInformation class.
This step would ideally not have been necessary (increases amount of
refactoring and templates necessary, which in turn increases build
times), but it gives us a couple of nice properties:
- SpinlockProtected inside Singleton (a very common combination) can now
obtain any lock rank just via the template parameter. It was not
previously possible to do this with SingletonInstanceCreator magic.
- SpinlockProtected's lock rank is now mandatory; this is the majority
of cases and allows us to see where we're still missing proper ranks.
- The type already informs us what lock rank a lock has, which aids code
readability and (possibly, if gdb cooperates) lock mismatch debugging.
- The rank of a lock can no longer be dynamic, which is not something we
wanted in the first place (or made use of). Locks randomly changing
their rank sounds like a disaster waiting to happen.
- In some places, we might be able to statically check that locks are
taken in the right order (with the right lock rank checking
implementation) as rank information is fully statically known.
This refactoring even more exposes the fact that Mutex has no lock rank
capabilites, which is not fixed here.
Instead, allow userspace to decide on the coredump directory path. By
default, SystemServer sets it to the /tmp/coredump directory, but users
can now change this by writing a new path to the sysfs node at
/sys/kernel/variables/coredump_directory, and also to read this node to
check where coredumps are currently generated at.
By default, disallow reading of values in that directory. Later on, we
will enable sparingly read access to specific files.
The idea that led to this mechanism was suggested by Jean-Baptiste
Boric (also known as boricj in GitHub), to prevent access to sensitive
information in the SysFS if someone adds a new file in the /sys/kernel
directory.
There's simply no benefit in allowing sandboxed programs to change the
power state of the machine, so disallow writes to the mentioned node to
prevent malicious programs to request that.
To accomplish this, we add another VeilState which is called
LockedInherited. The idea is to apply exec unveil data, similar to
execpromises of the pledge syscall, on the current exec'ed program
during the execve sequence. When applying the forced unveil data, the
veil state is set to be locked but the special state of LockedInherited
ensures that if the new program tries to unveil paths, the request will
silently be ignored, so the program will continue running without
receiving an error, but is still can only use the paths that were
unveiled before the exec syscall. This in turn, allows us to use the
unveil syscall with a special utility to sandbox other userland programs
in terms of what is visible to them on the filesystem, and is usable on
both programs that use or don't use the unveil syscall in their code.
Each GenericInterruptHandler now tracks the number of calls that each
CPU has serviced.
This takes care of a FIXME in the /sys/kernel/interrupts generator.
Also, the lsirq command line tool now displays per-CPU call counts.
Our implementation for Jails resembles much of how FreeBSD jails are
working - it's essentially only a matter of using a RefPtr in the
Process class to a Jail object. Then, when we iterate over all processes
in various cases, we could ensure if either the current process is in
jail and therefore should be restricted what is visible in terms of
PID isolation, and also to be able to expose metadata about Jails in
/sys/kernel/jails node (which does not reveal anything to a process
which is in jail).
A lifetime model for the Jail object is currently plain simple - there's
simpy no way to manually delete a Jail object once it was created. Such
feature should be carefully designed to allow safe destruction of a Jail
without the possibility of releasing a process which is in Jail from the
actual jail. Each process which is attached into a Jail cannot leave it
until the end of a Process (i.e. when finalizing a Process). All jails
are kept being referenced in the JailManagement. When a last attached
process is finalized, the Jail is automatically destroyed.
Let's put the power_state global node into the /sys/kernel directory,
because that directory represents all global nodes and variables being
related to the Kernel. It's also a mutable node, that is more acceptable
being in the mentioned directory due to the fact that all other files in
the /sys/firmware directory are just firmware blobs and are not mutable
at all.
The ProcFS is an utter mess currently, so let's start move things that
are not related to processes-info. To ensure it's done in a sane manner,
we start by duplicating all /proc/ global nodes to the /sys/kernel/
directory, then we will move Userland to use the new directory so the
old directory nodes can be removed from the /proc directory.
