Instead, allow userspace to decide on the coredump directory path. By
default, SystemServer sets it to the /tmp/coredump directory, but users
can now change this by writing a new path to the sysfs node at
/sys/kernel/variables/coredump_directory, and also to read this node to
check where coredumps are currently generated at.
By default, disallow reading of values in that directory. Later on, we
will enable sparingly read access to specific files.
The idea that led to this mechanism was suggested by Jean-Baptiste
Boric (also known as boricj in GitHub), to prevent access to sensitive
information in the SysFS if someone adds a new file in the /sys/kernel
directory.
There's simply no benefit in allowing sandboxed programs to change the
power state of the machine, so disallow writes to the mentioned node to
prevent malicious programs to request that.
To accomplish this, we add another VeilState which is called
LockedInherited. The idea is to apply exec unveil data, similar to
execpromises of the pledge syscall, on the current exec'ed program
during the execve sequence. When applying the forced unveil data, the
veil state is set to be locked but the special state of LockedInherited
ensures that if the new program tries to unveil paths, the request will
silently be ignored, so the program will continue running without
receiving an error, but is still can only use the paths that were
unveiled before the exec syscall. This in turn, allows us to use the
unveil syscall with a special utility to sandbox other userland programs
in terms of what is visible to them on the filesystem, and is usable on
both programs that use or don't use the unveil syscall in their code.
Each GenericInterruptHandler now tracks the number of calls that each
CPU has serviced.
This takes care of a FIXME in the /sys/kernel/interrupts generator.
Also, the lsirq command line tool now displays per-CPU call counts.
Our implementation for Jails resembles much of how FreeBSD jails are
working - it's essentially only a matter of using a RefPtr in the
Process class to a Jail object. Then, when we iterate over all processes
in various cases, we could ensure if either the current process is in
jail and therefore should be restricted what is visible in terms of
PID isolation, and also to be able to expose metadata about Jails in
/sys/kernel/jails node (which does not reveal anything to a process
which is in jail).
A lifetime model for the Jail object is currently plain simple - there's
simpy no way to manually delete a Jail object once it was created. Such
feature should be carefully designed to allow safe destruction of a Jail
without the possibility of releasing a process which is in Jail from the
actual jail. Each process which is attached into a Jail cannot leave it
until the end of a Process (i.e. when finalizing a Process). All jails
are kept being referenced in the JailManagement. When a last attached
process is finalized, the Jail is automatically destroyed.
Let's put the power_state global node into the /sys/kernel directory,
because that directory represents all global nodes and variables being
related to the Kernel. It's also a mutable node, that is more acceptable
being in the mentioned directory due to the fact that all other files in
the /sys/firmware directory are just firmware blobs and are not mutable
at all.
The ProcFS is an utter mess currently, so let's start move things that
are not related to processes-info. To ensure it's done in a sane manner,
we start by duplicating all /proc/ global nodes to the /sys/kernel/
directory, then we will move Userland to use the new directory so the
old directory nodes can be removed from the /proc directory.
