diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c index 097e409..3611588 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c @@ -109,339 +109,10 @@ * */ #include +#include -#define USE_SOCKETS -#include "e_os.h" -#include "cryptlib.h" -#include -#include "rand_lcl.h" - -#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)) - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) /* should actually be available virtually - * everywhere */ -# include -# endif -# include -# ifndef FD_SETSIZE -# define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set)) -# endif - -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) - -/* - * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to - * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the - * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses, - * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large - * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which - * it can be read. - * - * If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is more - * constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the clock can be - * read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results would be far - * more predictable. - * - * As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of seed - * data. - */ - -int RAND_poll(void) -{ - short int code; - gid_t curr_gid; - pid_t curr_pid; - uid_t curr_uid; - int i, k; - struct timespec ts; - unsigned char v; - -# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA - long duration; - extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code); -# else -# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 - long long duration; - extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code); -# else -# error "Unsupported Platform." -# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */ -# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */ - - /* - * Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* variation between - * different processes. - */ - - curr_gid = getgid(); - RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof(curr_gid), 1); - curr_gid = 0; - - curr_pid = getpid(); - RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid), 1); - curr_pid = 0; - - curr_uid = getuid(); - RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof(curr_uid), 1); - curr_uid = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) { - /* - * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus - * interference, etc. - */ - for (k = 0; k < 99; k++) - ts.tv_nsec = random(); - -# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA - /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */ - duration = 1; - s$sleep(&duration, &code); -# else -# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 - /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */ - duration = 1; - s$sleep2(&duration, &code); -# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */ -# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */ - - /* get wall clock time. */ - clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); - - /* take 8 bits */ - v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec % 256); - RAND_add(&v, sizeof(v), 1); - v = 0; - } - return 1; -} -# elif defined __OpenBSD__ int RAND_poll(void) { - u_int32_t rnd = 0, i; - unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rnd = arc4random(); - buf[i] = rnd; - rnd >>= 8; - } - RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED); - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); - - return 1; -} -# else /* !defined(__OpenBSD__) */ -int RAND_poll(void) -{ - unsigned long l; - pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); -# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) - unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; - int n = 0; -# endif -# ifdef DEVRANDOM - static const char *randomfiles[] = { DEVRANDOM }; - struct stat randomstats[sizeof(randomfiles) / sizeof(randomfiles[0])]; - int fd; - unsigned int i; -# endif -# ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD - static const char *egdsockets[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL }; - const char **egdsocket = NULL; -# endif - -# ifdef DEVRANDOM - memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats)); - /* - * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have - * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs - * out of random entries. - */ - - for (i = 0; (i < sizeof(randomfiles) / sizeof(randomfiles[0])) && - (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) { - if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY -# ifdef O_NONBLOCK - | O_NONBLOCK -# endif -# ifdef O_BINARY - | O_BINARY -# endif -# ifdef O_NOCTTY /* If it happens to be a TTY (god forbid), do - * not make it our controlling tty */ - | O_NOCTTY -# endif - )) >= 0) { - int usec = 10 * 1000; /* spend 10ms on each file */ - int r; - unsigned int j; - struct stat *st = &randomstats[i]; - - /* - * Avoid using same input... Used to be O_NOFOLLOW above, but - * it's not universally appropriate... - */ - if (fstat(fd, st) != 0) { - close(fd); - continue; - } - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - if (randomstats[j].st_ino == st->st_ino && - randomstats[j].st_dev == st->st_dev) - break; - } - if (j < i) { - close(fd); - continue; - } - - do { - int try_read = 0; - -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) - /* - * select() is broken in BeOS R5, so we simply try to read - * something and snooze if we couldn't - */ - try_read = 1; - -# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) - /* use poll() */ - struct pollfd pset; - - pset.fd = fd; - pset.events = POLLIN; - pset.revents = 0; - - if (poll(&pset, 1, usec / 1000) < 0) - usec = 0; - else - try_read = (pset.revents & POLLIN) != 0; - -# else - /* use select() */ - fd_set fset; - struct timeval t; - - t.tv_sec = 0; - t.tv_usec = usec; - - if (FD_SETSIZE > 0 && (unsigned)fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { - /* - * can't use select, so just try to read once anyway - */ - try_read = 1; - } else { - FD_ZERO(&fset); - FD_SET(fd, &fset); - - if (select(fd + 1, &fset, NULL, NULL, &t) >= 0) { - usec = t.tv_usec; - if (FD_ISSET(fd, &fset)) - try_read = 1; - } else - usec = 0; - } -# endif - - if (try_read) { - r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, - ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); - if (r > 0) - n += r; -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) - if (r == 0) - snooze(t.tv_usec); -# endif - } else - r = -1; - - /* - * Some Unixen will update t in select(), some won't. For - * those who won't, or if we didn't use select() in the first - * place, give up here, otherwise, we will do this once again - * for the remaining time. - */ - if (usec == 10 * 1000) - usec = 0; - } - while ((r > 0 || - (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0 - && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); - - close(fd); - } - } -# endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM) */ - -# ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD - /* - * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy - * collecting daemon. - */ - - for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED; - egdsocket++) { - int r; - - r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, - ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); - if (r > 0) - n += r; - } -# endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) */ - -# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) - if (n > 0) { - RAND_add(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), (double)n); - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf, n); - } -# endif - - /* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */ - l = curr_pid; - RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0); - l = getuid(); - RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0); - - l = time(NULL); - RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0); - -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS) - { - system_info sysInfo; - get_system_info(&sysInfo); - RAND_add(&sysInfo, sizeof(sysInfo), 0); - } -# endif - -# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) - return 1; -# else - return 0; -# endif + return rand(); } -# endif /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ -#endif /* !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || - * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || - * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || - * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || - * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || - * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)) */ - -#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) -int RAND_poll(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif