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			472 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			18 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C++
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			472 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			18 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C++
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * Copyright (c) 2020, Ali Mohammad Pur <ali.mpfard@gmail.com>
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|  * All rights reserved.
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|  *
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|  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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|  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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|  *
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|  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
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|  *    list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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|  *
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|  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
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|  *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
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|  *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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|  *
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|  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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|  * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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|  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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|  * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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|  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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|  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
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|  * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
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|  * CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
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|  * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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|  * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <AK/Endian.h>
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| 
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| #include <AK/MemoryStream.h>
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| #include <LibCore/Timer.h>
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| #include <LibCrypto/ASN1/DER.h>
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| #include <LibCrypto/PK/Code/EMSA_PSS.h>
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| #include <LibTLS/TLSv12.h>
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| 
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| namespace TLS {
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| 
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| void TLSv12::write_packet(ByteBuffer& packet)
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| {
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|     m_context.tls_buffer.append(packet.data(), packet.size());
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|     if (m_context.connection_status > ConnectionStatus::Disconnected) {
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|         if (!m_has_scheduled_write_flush) {
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|             dbg() << "Scheduling write of " << m_context.tls_buffer.size();
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| #endif
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|             deferred_invoke([this](auto&) { write_into_socket(); });
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|             m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
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|         } else {
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|             // multiple packet are available, let's flush some out
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|             dbg() << "Flushing scheduled write of " << m_context.tls_buffer.size();
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| #endif
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|             write_into_socket();
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|             // the deferred invoke is still in place
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|             m_has_scheduled_write_flush = true;
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|         }
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|     }
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| }
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| 
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| void TLSv12::update_packet(ByteBuffer& packet)
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| {
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|     u32 header_size = 5;
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|     *(u16*)packet.offset_pointer(3) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)(packet.size() - header_size));
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| 
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|     if (packet[0] != (u8)MessageType::ChangeCipher) {
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|         if (packet[0] == (u8)MessageType::Handshake && packet.size() > header_size) {
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|             u8 handshake_type = packet[header_size];
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|             if (handshake_type != HandshakeType::HelloRequest && handshake_type != HandshakeType::HelloVerifyRequest) {
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|                 update_hash(packet.bytes().slice(header_size, packet.size() - header_size));
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|             }
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|         }
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|         if (m_context.cipher_spec_set && m_context.crypto.created) {
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|             size_t length = packet.size() - header_size;
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|             size_t block_size, padding, mac_size;
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| 
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|             if (!is_aead()) {
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|                 block_size = m_aes_local.cbc->cipher().block_size();
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|                 // If the length is already a multiple a block_size,
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|                 // an entire block of padding is added.
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|                 // In short, we _never_ have no padding.
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|                 mac_size = mac_length();
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|                 length += mac_size;
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|                 padding = block_size - length % block_size;
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|                 length += padding;
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|             } else {
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|                 block_size = m_aes_local.gcm->cipher().block_size();
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|                 padding = 0;
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|                 mac_size = 0; // AEAD provides its own authentication scheme.
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|             }
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| 
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|             if (m_context.crypto.created == 1) {
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|                 // `buffer' will continue to be encrypted
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|                 auto buffer = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length);
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|                 size_t buffer_position = 0;
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|                 auto iv_size = iv_length();
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| 
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|                 // copy the packet, sans the header
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|                 buffer.overwrite(buffer_position, packet.offset_pointer(header_size), packet.size() - header_size);
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|                 buffer_position += packet.size() - header_size;
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| 
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|                 ByteBuffer ct;
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| 
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|                 if (is_aead()) {
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|                     // We need enough space for a header, the data, a tag, and the IV
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|                     ct = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length + header_size + iv_size + 16);
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| 
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|                     // copy the header over
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|                     ct.overwrite(0, packet.data(), header_size - 2);
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| 
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|                     // AEAD AAD (13)
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|                     // Seq. no (8)
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|                     // content type (1)
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|                     // version (2)
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|                     // length (2)
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|                     u8 aad[13];
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|                     Bytes aad_bytes { aad, 13 };
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|                     OutputMemoryStream aad_stream { aad_bytes };
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| 
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|                     u64 seq_no = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(m_context.local_sequence_number);
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|                     u16 len = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)(packet.size() - header_size));
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| 
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|                     aad_stream.write({ &seq_no, sizeof(seq_no) });
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|                     aad_stream.write(packet.bytes().slice(0, 3)); // content-type + version
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|                     aad_stream.write({ &len, sizeof(len) });      // length
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|                     ASSERT(aad_stream.is_end());
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| 
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|                     // AEAD IV (12)
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|                     // IV (4)
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|                     // (Nonce) (8)
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|                     // -- Our GCM impl takes 16 bytes
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|                     // zero (4)
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|                     u8 iv[16];
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|                     Bytes iv_bytes { iv, 16 };
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|                     Bytes { m_context.crypto.local_aead_iv, 4 }.copy_to(iv_bytes);
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|                     AK::fill_with_random(iv_bytes.offset(4), 8);
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|                     memset(iv_bytes.offset(12), 0, 4);
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| 
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|                     // write the random part of the iv out
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|                     iv_bytes.slice(4, 8).copy_to(ct.bytes().slice(header_size));
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| 
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|                     // Write the encrypted data and the tag
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|                     m_aes_local.gcm->encrypt(
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|                         packet.bytes().slice(header_size, length),
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|                         ct.bytes().slice(header_size + 8, length),
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|                         iv_bytes,
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|                         aad_bytes,
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|                         ct.bytes().slice(header_size + 8 + length, 16));
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| 
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|                     ASSERT(header_size + 8 + length + 16 == ct.size());
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| 
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|                 } else {
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|                     // We need enough space for a header, iv_length bytes of IV and whatever the packet contains
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|                     ct = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(length + header_size + iv_size);
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| 
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|                     // copy the header over
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|                     ct.overwrite(0, packet.data(), header_size - 2);
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| 
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|                     // get the appropricate HMAC value for the entire packet
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|                     auto mac = hmac_message(packet, {}, mac_size, true);
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| 
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|                     // write the MAC
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|                     buffer.overwrite(buffer_position, mac.data(), mac.size());
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|                     buffer_position += mac.size();
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| 
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|                     // Apply the padding (a packet MUST always be padded)
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|                     memset(buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position), padding - 1, padding);
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|                     buffer_position += padding;
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| 
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|                     ASSERT(buffer_position == buffer.size());
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| 
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|                     auto iv = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(iv_size);
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|                     AK::fill_with_random(iv.data(), iv.size());
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| 
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|                     // write it into the ciphertext portion of the message
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|                     ct.overwrite(header_size, iv.data(), iv.size());
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| 
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|                     ASSERT(header_size + iv_size + length == ct.size());
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|                     ASSERT(length % block_size == 0);
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| 
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|                     // get a block to encrypt into
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|                     auto view = ct.bytes().slice(header_size + iv_size, length);
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|                     m_aes_local.cbc->encrypt(buffer, view, iv);
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|                 }
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| 
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|                 // store the correct ciphertext length into the packet
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|                 u16 ct_length = (u16)ct.size() - header_size;
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| 
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|                 *(u16*)ct.offset_pointer(header_size - 2) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(ct_length);
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| 
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|                 // replace the packet with the ciphertext
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|                 packet = ct;
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|             }
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|         }
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|     }
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|     ++m_context.local_sequence_number;
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| }
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| 
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| void TLSv12::update_hash(ReadonlyBytes message)
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| {
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|     m_context.handshake_hash.update(message);
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| }
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| 
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| ByteBuffer TLSv12::hmac_message(const ReadonlyBytes& buf, const Optional<ReadonlyBytes> buf2, size_t mac_length, bool local)
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| {
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|     u64 sequence_number = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(local ? m_context.local_sequence_number : m_context.remote_sequence_number);
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|     ensure_hmac(mac_length, local);
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|     auto& hmac = local ? *m_hmac_local : *m_hmac_remote;
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|     dbg() << "========================= PACKET DATA ==========================";
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|     print_buffer((const u8*)&sequence_number, sizeof(u64));
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|     print_buffer(buf.data(), buf.size());
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|     if (buf2.has_value())
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|         print_buffer(buf2.value().data(), buf2.value().size());
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|     dbg() << "========================= PACKET DATA ==========================";
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| #endif
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|     hmac.update((const u8*)&sequence_number, sizeof(u64));
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|     hmac.update(buf);
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|     if (buf2.has_value() && buf2.value().size()) {
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|         hmac.update(buf2.value());
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|     }
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|     auto digest = hmac.digest();
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|     auto mac = ByteBuffer::copy(digest.immutable_data(), digest.data_length());
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|     dbg() << "HMAC of the block for sequence number " << sequence_number;
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|     print_buffer(mac);
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| #endif
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|     return mac;
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| }
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| 
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| ssize_t TLSv12::handle_message(ReadonlyBytes buffer)
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| {
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|     auto res { 5ll };
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|     size_t header_size = res;
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|     ssize_t payload_res = 0;
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| 
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|     dbg() << "buffer size: " << buffer.size();
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| #endif
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|     if (buffer.size() < 5) {
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|         return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
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|     }
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| 
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|     auto type = (MessageType)buffer[0];
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|     size_t buffer_position { 1 };
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| 
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|     // FIXME: Read the version and verify it
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|     auto version = (Version) * (const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position);
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|     dbg() << "type: " << (u8)type << " version: " << (u16)version;
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| #endif
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|     buffer_position += 2;
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| 
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|     auto length = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(*(const u16*)buffer.offset_pointer(buffer_position));
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|     dbg() << "record length: " << length << " at offset: " << buffer_position;
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| #endif
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|     buffer_position += 2;
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| 
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|     if (buffer_position + length > buffer.size()) {
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|         dbg() << "record length more than what we have: " << buffer.size();
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| #endif
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|         return (i8)Error::NeedMoreData;
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|     }
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| 
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|     dbg() << "message type: " << (u8)type << ", length: " << length;
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| #endif
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|     auto plain = buffer.slice(buffer_position, buffer.size() - buffer_position);
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| 
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|     ByteBuffer decrypted;
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| 
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|     if (m_context.cipher_spec_set && type != MessageType::ChangeCipher) {
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|         dbg() << "Encrypted: ";
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|         print_buffer(buffer.slice(header_size, length));
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| #endif
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| 
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|         if (is_aead()) {
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|             ASSERT(m_aes_remote.gcm);
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| 
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|             if (length < 24) {
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|                 dbg() << "Invalid packet length";
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|                 auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptError);
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|                 write_packet(packet);
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|                 return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
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|             }
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| 
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|             auto packet_length = length - iv_length() - 16;
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|             auto payload = plain;
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|             decrypted = ByteBuffer::create_uninitialized(packet_length);
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| 
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|             // AEAD AAD (13)
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|             // Seq. no (8)
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|             // content type (1)
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|             // version (2)
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|             // length (2)
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|             u8 aad[13];
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|             Bytes aad_bytes { aad, 13 };
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|             OutputMemoryStream aad_stream { aad_bytes };
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| 
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|             u64 seq_no = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(m_context.remote_sequence_number);
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|             u16 len = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian((u16)packet_length);
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| 
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|             aad_stream.write({ &seq_no, sizeof(seq_no) });      // Sequence number
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|             aad_stream.write(buffer.slice(0, header_size - 2)); // content-type + version
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|             aad_stream.write({ &len, sizeof(u16) });
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|             ASSERT(aad_stream.is_end());
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| 
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|             auto nonce = payload.slice(0, iv_length());
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|             payload = payload.slice(iv_length());
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| 
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|             // AEAD IV (12)
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|             // IV (4)
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|             // (Nonce) (8)
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|             // -- Our GCM impl takes 16 bytes
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|             // zero (4)
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|             u8 iv[16];
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|             Bytes iv_bytes { iv, 16 };
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|             Bytes { m_context.crypto.remote_aead_iv, 4 }.copy_to(iv_bytes);
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|             nonce.copy_to(iv_bytes.slice(4));
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|             memset(iv_bytes.offset(12), 0, 4);
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| 
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|             auto ciphertext = payload.slice(0, payload.size() - 16);
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|             auto tag = payload.slice(ciphertext.size());
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| 
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|             auto consistency = m_aes_remote.gcm->decrypt(
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|                 ciphertext,
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|                 decrypted,
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|                 iv_bytes,
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|                 aad_bytes,
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|                 tag);
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| 
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|             if (consistency != Crypto::VerificationConsistency::Consistent) {
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|                 dbg() << "integrity check failed (tag length " << tag.size() << ")";
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|                 auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
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|                 write_packet(packet);
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| 
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|                 return (i8)Error::IntegrityCheckFailed;
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|             }
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| 
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|             plain = decrypted;
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|         } else {
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|             ASSERT(m_aes_remote.cbc);
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|             auto iv_size = iv_length();
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| 
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|             auto decrypted = m_aes_remote.cbc->create_aligned_buffer(length - iv_size);
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|             auto iv = buffer.slice(header_size, iv_size);
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| 
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|             Bytes decrypted_span = decrypted;
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|             m_aes_remote.cbc->decrypt(buffer.slice(header_size + iv_size, length - iv_size), decrypted_span, iv);
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| 
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|             length = decrypted_span.size();
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| 
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|             dbg() << "Decrypted: ";
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|             print_buffer(decrypted);
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| #endif
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| 
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|             auto mac_size = mac_length();
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|             if (length < mac_size) {
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|                 dbg() << "broken packet";
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|                 auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::DecryptError);
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|                 write_packet(packet);
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|                 return (i8)Error::BrokenPacket;
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|             }
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| 
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|             length -= mac_size;
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| 
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|             const u8* message_hmac = decrypted_span.offset(length);
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|             u8 temp_buf[5];
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|             memcpy(temp_buf, buffer.offset_pointer(0), 3);
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|             *(u16*)(temp_buf + 3) = AK::convert_between_host_and_network_endian(length);
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|             auto hmac = hmac_message({ temp_buf, 5 }, decrypted_span.slice(0, length), mac_size);
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|             auto message_mac = ReadonlyBytes { message_hmac, mac_size };
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|             if (hmac != message_mac) {
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|                 dbg() << "integrity check failed (mac length " << mac_size << ")";
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|                 dbg() << "mac received:";
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|                 print_buffer(message_mac);
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|                 dbg() << "mac computed:";
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|                 print_buffer(hmac);
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|                 auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::BadRecordMAC);
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|                 write_packet(packet);
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| 
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|                 return (i8)Error::IntegrityCheckFailed;
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|             }
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|             plain = decrypted.slice(0, length);
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|         }
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|     }
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|     m_context.remote_sequence_number++;
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| 
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|     switch (type) {
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|     case MessageType::ApplicationData:
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|         if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::Established) {
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|             dbg() << "unexpected application data";
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|             payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
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|             auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
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|             write_packet(packet);
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|         } else {
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|             dbg() << "application data message of size " << plain.size();
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| #endif
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| 
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|             m_context.application_buffer.append(plain.data(), plain.size());
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|         }
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|         break;
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|     case MessageType::Handshake:
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|         dbg() << "tls handshake message";
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| #endif
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|         payload_res = handle_payload(plain);
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|         break;
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|     case MessageType::ChangeCipher:
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|         if (m_context.connection_status != ConnectionStatus::KeyExchange) {
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|             dbg() << "unexpected change cipher message";
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|             auto packet = build_alert(true, (u8)AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
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|             payload_res = (i8)Error::UnexpectedMessage;
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|         } else {
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|             dbg() << "change cipher spec message";
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| #endif
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|             m_context.cipher_spec_set = true;
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|             m_context.remote_sequence_number = 0;
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|         }
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|         break;
 | |
|     case MessageType::Alert:
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|         dbg() << "alert message of length " << length;
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| #endif
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|         if (length >= 2) {
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| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
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|             print_buffer(plain);
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| #endif
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|             auto level = plain[0];
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|             auto code = plain[1];
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|             if (level == (u8)AlertLevel::Critical) {
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|                 dbg() << "We were alerted of a critical error: " << code << " (" << alert_name((AlertDescription)code) << ")";
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|                 m_context.critical_error = code;
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|                 try_disambiguate_error();
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|                 res = (i8)Error::UnknownError;
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|             } else {
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|                 dbg() << "Alert: " << code;
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|             }
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|             if (code == 0) {
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|                 // close notify
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|                 res += 2;
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|                 alert(AlertLevel::Critical, AlertDescription::CloseNotify);
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|                 m_context.connection_finished = true;
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|                 if (!m_context.cipher_spec_set) {
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|                     // AWS CloudFront hits this.
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|                     dbg() << "Server sent a close notify and we haven't agreed on a cipher suite. Treating it as a handshake failure.";
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|                     m_context.critical_error = (u8)AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure;
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|                     try_disambiguate_error();
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|                 }
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|             }
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|             m_context.error_code = (Error)code;
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|         }
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|         break;
 | |
|     default:
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|         dbg() << "message not understood";
 | |
|         return (i8)Error::NotUnderstood;
 | |
|     }
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| 
 | |
|     if (payload_res < 0)
 | |
|         return payload_res;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (res > 0)
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|         return header_size + length;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     return res;
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| }
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| 
 | |
| }
 | 
