mirror of
				https://github.com/RGBCube/serenity
				synced 2025-10-31 08:12:43 +00:00 
			
		
		
		
	
		
			
				
	
	
		
			197 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			7.3 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C++
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			197 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			7.3 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C++
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
 | |
|  * Copyright (c) 2020, Peter Elliott <pelliott@serenityos.org>
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
 | |
|  */
 | |
| 
 | |
| #pragma once
 | |
| 
 | |
| #include <AK/StringBuilder.h>
 | |
| #include <AK/StringView.h>
 | |
| #include <LibCrypto/Cipher/Mode/Mode.h>
 | |
| 
 | |
| #ifndef KERNEL
 | |
| #    include <AK/DeprecatedString.h>
 | |
| #endif
 | |
| 
 | |
| namespace Crypto {
 | |
| namespace Cipher {
 | |
| 
 | |
| /*
 | |
|  * Heads up: CTR is a *family* of modes, because the "counter" function is
 | |
|  * implementation-defined. This makes interoperability a pain in the neurons.
 | |
|  * Here are several contradicting(!) interpretations:
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * "The counter can be *any function* which produces a sequence which is
 | |
|  * guaranteed not to repeat for a long time, although an actual increment-by-one
 | |
|  * counter is the simplest and most popular."
 | |
|  * The illustrations show that first increment should happen *after* the first
 | |
|  * round. I call this variant BIGINT_INCR_0.
 | |
|  * The AESAVS goes a step further and requires only that "counters" do not
 | |
|  * repeat, leaving the method of counting completely open.
 | |
|  * See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Counter_(CTR)
 | |
|  * See: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/documents/aes/aesavs.pdf
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * BIGINT_INCR_0 is the behavior of the OpenSSL command "openssl enc -aes-128-ctr",
 | |
|  * and the behavior of CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(). OpenSSL is not alone in the
 | |
|  * assumption that BIGINT_INCR_0 is all there is; even some NIST
 | |
|  * specification/survey(?) doesn't consider counting any other way.
 | |
|  * See: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/33388b44b67145af2181b1e9528c381c8ea0d1b6/crypto/modes/ctr128.c#L71
 | |
|  * See: http://www.cryptogrium.com/aes-ctr.html
 | |
|  * See: https://web.archive.org/web/20150226072817/http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/ctr/ctr-spec.pdf
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * "[T]he successive counter blocks are derived by applying an incrementing
 | |
|  * function."
 | |
|  * It defines a *family* of functions called "Standard Incrementing Function"
 | |
|  * which only increment the lower-m bits, for some number 0<m<=blocksize.
 | |
|  * The included test vectors suggest that the first increment should happen
 | |
|  * *after* the first round. I call this INT32_INCR_0, or in general INTm_INCR_0.
 | |
|  * This in particular is the behavior of CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32() in OpenSSL.
 | |
|  * See: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf
 | |
|  * See: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/33388b44b67145af2181b1e9528c381c8ea0d1b6/crypto/modes/ctr128.c#L147
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * The python package "cryptography" and RFC 3686 (which appears among the
 | |
|  * first online search results when searching for "AES CTR 128 test vector")
 | |
|  * share a peculiar interpretation of CTR mode: the counter is incremented *before*
 | |
|  * the first round. RFC 3686 does not consider any other interpretation. I call
 | |
|  * this variant BIGINT_INCR_1.
 | |
|  * See: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3686.html#section-6
 | |
|  * See: https://cryptography.io/en/latest/development/test-vectors/#symmetric-ciphers
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * And finally, because the method is left open, a different increment could be
 | |
|  * used, for example little endian, or host endian, or mixed endian. Or any crazy
 | |
|  * LSFR with sufficiently large period. That is the reason for the constant part
 | |
|  * "INCR" in the previous counters.
 | |
|  *
 | |
|  * Due to this plethora of mutually-incompatible counters,
 | |
|  * the method of counting should be a template parameter.
 | |
|  * This currently implements BIGINT_INCR_0, which means perfect
 | |
|  * interoperability with openssl. The test vectors from RFC 3686 just need to be
 | |
|  * incremented by 1.
 | |
|  * TODO: Implement other counters?
 | |
|  */
 | |
| 
 | |
| struct IncrementInplace {
 | |
|     void operator()(Bytes& in) const
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         for (size_t i = in.size(); i > 0;) {
 | |
|             --i;
 | |
|             if (in[i] == (u8)-1) {
 | |
|                 in[i] = 0;
 | |
|             } else {
 | |
|                 in[i]++;
 | |
|                 break;
 | |
|             }
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| };
 | |
| 
 | |
| template<typename T, typename IncrementFunctionType = IncrementInplace>
 | |
| class CTR : public Mode<T> {
 | |
| public:
 | |
|     constexpr static size_t IVSizeInBits = 128;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     virtual ~CTR() = default;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     // Must intercept `Intent`, because AES must always be set to
 | |
|     // Encryption, even when decrypting AES-CTR.
 | |
|     // TODO: How to deal with ciphers that take different arguments?
 | |
|     // FIXME: Add back the default intent parameter once clang-11 is the default in GitHub Actions.
 | |
|     //        Once added back, remove the parameter where it's constructed in get_random_bytes in Kernel/Security/Random.h.
 | |
|     template<typename KeyType, typename... Args>
 | |
|     explicit constexpr CTR(KeyType const& user_key, size_t key_bits, Intent, Args... args)
 | |
|         : Mode<T>(user_key, key_bits, Intent::Encryption, args...)
 | |
|     {
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
| #ifndef KERNEL
 | |
|     virtual DeprecatedString class_name() const override
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         StringBuilder builder;
 | |
|         builder.append(this->cipher().class_name());
 | |
|         builder.append("_CTR"sv);
 | |
|         return builder.to_deprecated_string();
 | |
|     }
 | |
| #endif
 | |
| 
 | |
|     virtual size_t IV_length() const override
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         return IVSizeInBits / 8;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     virtual void encrypt(ReadonlyBytes in, Bytes& out, ReadonlyBytes ivec = {}, Bytes* ivec_out = nullptr) override
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         // Our interpretation of "ivec" is what AES-CTR
 | |
|         // would define as nonce + IV + 4 zero bytes.
 | |
|         this->encrypt_or_stream(&in, out, ivec, ivec_out);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     void key_stream(Bytes& out, Bytes const& ivec = {}, Bytes* ivec_out = nullptr)
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         this->encrypt_or_stream(nullptr, out, ivec, ivec_out);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     virtual void decrypt(ReadonlyBytes in, Bytes& out, ReadonlyBytes ivec = {}) override
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         // XOR (and thus CTR) is the most symmetric mode.
 | |
|         this->encrypt(in, out, ivec);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
| private:
 | |
|     u8 m_ivec_storage[IVSizeInBits / 8];
 | |
|     typename T::BlockType m_cipher_block {};
 | |
| 
 | |
| protected:
 | |
|     constexpr static IncrementFunctionType increment {};
 | |
| 
 | |
|     void encrypt_or_stream(ReadonlyBytes const* in, Bytes& out, ReadonlyBytes ivec, Bytes* ivec_out = nullptr)
 | |
|     {
 | |
|         size_t length;
 | |
|         if (in) {
 | |
|             VERIFY(in->size() <= out.size());
 | |
|             length = in->size();
 | |
|             if (length == 0)
 | |
|                 return;
 | |
|         } else {
 | |
|             length = out.size();
 | |
|         }
 | |
| 
 | |
|         auto& cipher = this->cipher();
 | |
| 
 | |
|         // FIXME: We should have two of these encrypt/decrypt functions that
 | |
|         //        we SFINAE out based on whether the Cipher mode needs an ivec
 | |
|         VERIFY(!ivec.is_empty());
 | |
|         VERIFY(ivec.size() >= IV_length());
 | |
| 
 | |
|         m_cipher_block.set_padding_mode(cipher.padding_mode());
 | |
| 
 | |
|         __builtin_memcpy(m_ivec_storage, ivec.data(), IV_length());
 | |
|         Bytes iv { m_ivec_storage, IV_length() };
 | |
| 
 | |
|         size_t offset { 0 };
 | |
|         auto block_size = cipher.block_size();
 | |
| 
 | |
|         while (length > 0) {
 | |
|             m_cipher_block.overwrite(iv.slice(0, block_size));
 | |
| 
 | |
|             cipher.encrypt_block(m_cipher_block, m_cipher_block);
 | |
|             if (in) {
 | |
|                 m_cipher_block.apply_initialization_vector(in->slice(offset));
 | |
|             }
 | |
|             auto write_size = min(block_size, length);
 | |
| 
 | |
|             VERIFY(offset + write_size <= out.size());
 | |
|             __builtin_memcpy(out.offset(offset), m_cipher_block.bytes().data(), write_size);
 | |
| 
 | |
|             increment(iv);
 | |
|             length -= write_size;
 | |
|             offset += write_size;
 | |
|         }
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if (ivec_out)
 | |
|             __builtin_memcpy(ivec_out->data(), iv.data(), min(ivec_out->size(), IV_length()));
 | |
|     }
 | |
| };
 | |
| 
 | |
| }
 | |
| }
 | 
