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https://github.com/RGBCube/serenity
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As per comment found in #6319 by @bcoles, `pls` should check the permissions and owner of the sudoers file to ensure that it hasn't been compromised.
222 lines
5.9 KiB
C++
222 lines
5.9 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2021, Jesse Buhagiar <jooster669@gmail.com>
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
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*/
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#include <AK/LexicalPath.h>
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#include <AK/String.h>
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#include <AK/StringBuilder.h>
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#include <AK/Types.h>
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#include <AK/Vector.h>
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#include <LibCore/Account.h>
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#include <LibCore/ArgsParser.h>
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#include <LibCore/DirIterator.h>
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#include <LibCore/File.h>
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#include <LibCore/GetPassword.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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static constexpr mode_t EXPECTED_PERMS = (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR);
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// Function Definitions
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extern "C" int main(int arch, char** argv);
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bool unveil_paths(const char*);
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// Unveil paths, given the current user's path and the command they want to execute
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bool unveil_paths(const char* command)
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{
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bool did_unveil_ok = false;
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// Attempt to unveil command via `realpath`
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auto* command_path = realpath(command, nullptr);
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// Command found via `realpath` (meaning it was probably a locally executed program)
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if (command_path) {
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if (unveil(command_path, "x") == 0)
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did_unveil_ok = true;
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free(command_path);
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return did_unveil_ok;
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}
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// Okay, so we couldn't find the actual file specified by the user, let's
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// instead search PATH for it...
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auto command_path_system = Core::find_executable_in_path(command);
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if (command_path_system.is_empty())
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return false;
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if (unveil(command_path_system.characters(), "x") == 0)
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did_unveil_ok = true;
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return did_unveil_ok;
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}
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int main(int argc, char** argv)
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{
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Vector<const char*> command;
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Core::ArgsParser args_parser;
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args_parser.add_positional_argument(command, "Command to run at elevated privilege level", "command");
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args_parser.parse(argc, argv);
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if (pledge("stdio tty rpath exec id", nullptr) < 0) {
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perror("pledge");
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return 1;
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}
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if (unveil("/etc/plsusers", "r") < 0) {
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perror("unveil");
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return 1;
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}
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if (unveil("/etc/passwd", "r") < 0) {
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perror("unveil");
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return 1;
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}
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if (unveil("/etc/shadow", "r") < 0) {
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perror("unveil");
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return 1;
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}
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if (unveil("/etc/group", "r") < 0) {
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perror("unveil");
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return 1;
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}
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// Unveil all paths in the user's PATH, as well as the command they've specified.
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auto unveil_count = unveil_paths(command.at(0));
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if (unveil_count == 0) {
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warnln("Error: Failed to unveil paths!");
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return 1;
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}
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// Lock veil
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unveil(nullptr, nullptr);
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// Call `seteuid` so we can access `/etc/plsusers`
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if (seteuid(0) < 0) {
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perror("seteuid");
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return 1;
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}
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// Check the permissions and owner of /etc/plsusers. This ensures the integrity of the file.
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struct stat pls_users_stat;
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if (stat("/etc/plsusers", &pls_users_stat) < 0) {
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perror("stat");
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return 1;
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}
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if (pls_users_stat.st_mode != EXPECTED_PERMS) {
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warnln("Error: /etc/plsusers has incorrect permissions.");
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return 4;
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}
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if (pls_users_stat.st_uid != 0 && pls_users_stat.st_gid != 0) {
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warnln("Error: /etc/plsusers is not owned by root.");
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return 4;
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}
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auto pls_users_file_or_error = Core::File::open("/etc/plsusers", Core::OpenMode::ReadOnly);
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if (pls_users_file_or_error.is_error()) {
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warnln("Error: Could not open /etc/plsusers: {}", pls_users_file_or_error.error());
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return 1;
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}
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const char* username = getlogin();
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bool user_found = false;
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for (auto line = pls_users_file_or_error.value()->line_begin(); !line.at_end(); ++line) {
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auto line_str = *line;
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// Skip any comments
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if (line_str.starts_with("#"))
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continue;
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// Our user is in the plsusers file!
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if (line_str.to_string() == username) {
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user_found = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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// User isn't in the plsusers file
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if (!user_found) {
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warnln("{} is not in the plsusers file!", username);
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return 2;
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}
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// The user was in the plsusers file, now let's ask for their password to ensure that it's actually them...
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auto account_or_error = Core::Account::from_name(username);
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if (account_or_error.is_error()) {
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warnln("Core::Account::from_name: {}", account_or_error.error());
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return 1;
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}
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const auto& account = account_or_error.value();
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uid_t current_uid = getuid();
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if (current_uid != 0 && account.has_password()) {
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auto password = Core::get_password();
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if (password.is_error()) {
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warnln("{}", password.error());
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return 1;
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}
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if (!account.authenticate(password.value().characters())) {
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warnln("Incorrect or disabled password.");
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return 1;
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}
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}
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// TODO: Support swapping users instead of just defaulting to root
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if (setgid(0) < 0) {
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perror("setgid");
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return 1;
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}
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if (setuid(0) < 0) {
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perror("setuid");
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return 1;
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}
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// Build the arguments list passed to `execvpe`
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Vector<const char*> exec_args;
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for (const auto& arg : command) {
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exec_args.append(arg);
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}
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// Always terminate with a NULL (to signal end of args list)
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exec_args.append(nullptr);
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// Build the environment arguments
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StringBuilder builder;
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Vector<String> env_args_str;
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// TERM envvar
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char* env_term = getenv("TERM");
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if (env_term != nullptr) {
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builder.append("TERM=");
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builder.append(env_term);
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env_args_str.append(builder.build());
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}
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Vector<const char*> env_args;
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for (auto& arg : env_args_str) {
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env_args.append(arg.characters());
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}
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// Arguments list must be terminated with NULL argument
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env_args.append(nullptr);
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// Execute the desired command
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if (execvpe(command.at(0), const_cast<char**>(exec_args.data()), const_cast<char**>(env_args.data())) < 0) {
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perror("execvpe");
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exit(1);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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